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EXPLAINING HABEAS CORPUS
LARRY W.

YACKLE*

In an era when increasingly vociferous attacks on federal habeas corpus doctrine
threaten the availabilityof the writ, the development of a contemporaryrelevant explanation for the doctrine isparticularly importan In this Article, Professor Larry
Yackle fashions an alternative to the traditionalexplanation. Professor Yackle begins
by illuminatingthe deficiencies in the conventional "custody" explanation. He then
canvasses the criticisms of the modern use of the writ and various proposalsfor its
change or abolition. Next, he presents his explanation. Professor Yackle contends that
the writ is better explained as providing a federalforum in which to enforce federal
rights that may be unpopular with the states. His theory accounts both for the availability of thefederalforum to state criminaldefendants with federal claims andfor the
postponement offederal adjudication until after the completion of state proceedings.
In conclusion, Professor Yackle elaborates on the implications of his model of collateral reviewfor related areas of the law andfor current habeas doctrine itself

INTRODUCTION

The controversy surrounding federal habeas corpus has not abated.1
It will continue until the federal courts' authority to discharge prisoners
from state custody is explained on some conceptually satisfying basis.2 I
mean in this Article to offer such an explanation. Conventional wisdom
* Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B., 1968, J.D., 1973, University of Kansas;

LL.M., 1974, Harvard University.
I would like to thank Thomas E. Baker, Michael J. Churgin, Jerome Hoffman, Aviam
Soifer, and especially Lawrence G. Sager for comments on the initial draft of this piece. I also
had the benefit of presenting a draft to the Legal Theory Workshop at Boston University. At
various places below, I have tried to respond to the points and questions raised in that
company.
I See C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 53, at 344 (4th ed. 1983) (noting that
"habeas corpus for state prisoners is, and always has been, a controversial and emotion-ridden
subject"). See generally State Prisoner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures, 44 Ohio St.
L.J. 269 (1983); State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 599
(1981).
2 There is also debate over the related question whether federal criminal judgments should
be open to collateral attack. It is less vigorous, however, because comity and federalism do not
figure in that discussion. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228-31 (1969) (holding
that claims asserted by prisoners attacking federal judgments require the protection of collat991
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justifies habeas on the ground that the individual interest at stake-physical liberty-warrants supervision of state criminal process by the lower
federal courts.3 That rationale does not withstand scrutiny. It implies
that habeas is no more than a throw-back to the days when substantive
rights were bound up inextricably with forms of action freighted with
mysterious complexity; it breeds misconceived proposals to eliminate or
to trim the writ's availability; it distracts attention from the very practical and instrumental uses to which the writ has been put by the modem
Supreme Court; and it frustrates serious consideration of the role the writ
plays within the framework of federal jurisdiction generally.
At first glance, the very existence of habeas appears anomalous.
State courts plainly are empowered to determine federal issues that arise
in state criminal prosecutions, 4 and the federal district courts lack power
to review state judgments directlyA Yet under the rule of Brown v.
Allen, 6 prisoners may attack their state convictions collaterally by way of
habeas corpus, 7 which is perforce unencumbered by ordinary preclusion
rules.8 If they are successful, applicants obtain orders for their release,
provided that state authorities are unable to cure federal error in further
state proceedings. 9 In conventional theory, habeas merely permits petieral review even though federal prisoners had access to a federal forum in the first instance).
See notes 8, 45, 62 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 23-26 infra.
4 U.S. Const. art. VI; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (stating that "[u]pon
the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce,
and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States").
5 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

6 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

7 The Brown case is widely understood to have established, or at least affirmed, the proposition that federal constitutional issues adjudicated in state court can be relitigated in federal
habeas corpus. See, e.g., P. Bator, D. Shapiro, P. Mishkin & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1465 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler].
Later, in its great trilogy of habeas cases in 1963, the Warren Court built upon the Brown idea.
See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
8 Brown, 344 U.S. at 458; see Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924). Some specially
designed preclusion rules exist within federal habeas-in cases in which the respondent raises
claims that were or might have been raised in previousfederalhabeas proceedings. The Court
held in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), that a federal district court may give
controlling weight to a prior judgment if the "same ground" was presented and determined
adversely in the previous adjudication, the prior determination was "on the merits," and the
"ends ofjustice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." Id.
at 15. As to new claims that were not, but might have been, raised in prior proceedings, the
Court held in Sanders that the district court may dismiss only if the petitioner is found to have
abused the writ by deliberately withholding or abandoning a claim in the first application. Id.
at 17-18. A more recent statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982), and the applicable rule, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, Rule 9(b) (1982), codify the holdings in Sanders. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21
(1982).
9 See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 569 (1971); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

December 1985]

EXPLAINING HABEAS CORPUS

tioners to contest the validity of their detention in independent, civil proceedings in the federal forum. 10 Indeed, the federal habeas courts have
power to act "only on the body of the petitioner."" In reality, habeas
offers a vehicle for the federal relitigation of federal questions, factual
12
and legal, as a sequel to state court adjudication.
Postconviction habeas does not exist because of enthusiasm for collateral review among the current Justices of the Supreme Court. Several
13
members of the Court have complained bitterly about the writ, both on
729 (1961). The language of the relevant statutes and the habeas corpus rules is a bit more
elastic. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982) (authorizing the district courts to "dispose of the
[habeas] matter as law and justice require"); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982) (referring to the
habeas courts' power to order "release from custody or other remedy"); 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
Rule 2(b) (1982) (permitting applicants to pray for "appropriate relief"); 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Rule 8(a) (1982) (authorizing the district courts to dispose of petitions "as justice shall
require").
10 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963).
11 Id. at 431.
12See id. at 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (insisting that "ordering the prisoner's release
invalidates the judgment of conviction"); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1485 (asking rhetorically how a court can "determine the lawfulness of a detention without considering the
lawfulness of the judgment which authorized it"). The Court has dropped its guard on occasion. E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 274 n.21 (1981) (refusing to vacate a state criminal
judgment on appeal but stating that "this relief may be available in habeas corpus
proceedings").
13Justice Rehnquist has been the most critical. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in
Snead v. Stringer, 454 U.S. 988 (1981), he stated that "[i]t is scarcely surprising that fewer and
fewer capable lawyers can be found to serve on state benches when they may find their considered decisions overturned by the ruling of a single federal district judge on grounds as tenuous
as these." Id. at 993-94. His criticism has been particularly sharp in capital cases, in which he
apparently believes litigants abuse the habeas machinery to postpone executions. In another
dissent from a denial of certiorari, for example, he complained that after years of litigation in
state court the prisoner's death sentence~was "still not final" because "as in so many criminal
cases these days" the prisoner had been able to seek relitigation of federal claims in habeas.
Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U.S. 1014, 1015 (1981).
In a separate statement filed in Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983), the Chief Justice
proposed the consideration of "limitations on the availability of the writ of habeas corpus in
federal courts, especially for prisoners pressing stale claims that were fully ventilated in state
courts." Id. at 1093-94. In his view, stale claims "impose especially heavy burdens on the
prison system, on society, and on the administration of justice." Id. at 1096. The Court's
willingness to entertain them and society's "constant willingness to reopen cases long closed
tells the public that we have no confidence that the laws are administered justly." Id. at 1097.
Justice Powell has argued repeatedly that the scope of habeas should be restricted. Concurring
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), he insisted that "[a]t some point the law
must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting
every imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should look forward to rehabilitation
and to becoming a constructive citizen." Id. at 262. Justice O'Connor, the author of several
majority opinions of late, has found it necessary to marshal the "costs" of collateral review
before addressing the particular issue at bar. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982). She has
noted that habeas "extends the ordeal of trial," that it "degrades the prominence of the trial
itself," that it may result in the release of "admitted offenders," and that it frustrates "both the
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and off14 the bench. Moreover, the Court has established procedural
barriers that may frustrate the effective use of habeas-especially by pro
se petitioners.1 5 Nevertheless, the Justices have eschewed any forthright
assault on the substance of the writ. 16 The question before the house is
"why?" If the Justices are disenchanted with habeas, and some of them
surely are, why do they not gather themselves to abrogate collateral review entirely? The answer provided by section 2241 is incomplete. 1 7
States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Id. at 126-28.
Other Justices have been less vociferous in their comments. In the "custody" case, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), Justice Blackmun said that the "common-law scholars of the past hardly would recognize" the writ today. Id. at 501 (concurring
opinion). Writing for the Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), Justice White
insisted that the role of habeas is "secondary and limited" and that the lower federal courts are
not "forums in which to relitigate state trials." Id. at 887. Sitting as Circuit Justice in Autry
v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301 (1983), he offered his view that "it would be desirable to require by
statute that all federal grounds for challenging a conviction or a sentence be presented in the
first petition for habeas corpus." Id. at 1303. And Justice Stevens said in Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509 (1982), that, in his opinion, the district judge below had exceeded the "proper restraints on the scope of collateral review of state-court judgments." Id. at 539 (dissenting
opinion).
14 Addressing the American Bar Association recently, Chief Justice Burger questioned
whether habeas is not an "endless quest for technical errors unrelated to guilt or innocence."
Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice of the United
States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 292 (1981). And in a recent speech, Justice Powell asked Congress to
limit habeas to "cases of manifest injustice, where the issue is guilt or innocence." L. Powell,
Remarks at the Eleventh Circuit Conference, Savannah, Georgia (May 8-10, 1983) (on file at
New York University Law Review). Cf. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the
Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm.& Mary L. Rev.
801 (1981) (presenting views unsympathetic to habeas-but expressing doubt that it discourages able men and women from becoming state judges).
15 The "total exhaustion" rule established in Rose, 455 U.S. 509, is a case in point. In an
opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, Justice Blackmun condemned the majority's
position in strong terms:
What troubles me is that the "total exhaustion" rule, now adopted by this Court, can be
read into the statute. . only by sheer force; that it operates as a trap for the uneducated and indigent pro se prisoner-applicant; that it delays the resolution of claims that
are not frivolous; and that it tends to increase, rather than to alleviate, the caseload
burdens on both state and federal courts.
Id. at 522. Justice Stevens took a similar view. Id. at 550 (dissenting opinion) (complaining
of "procedural niceties that merely complicate and delay the resolution of disputes"). See also
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 136 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(calling attention to "the Court's preoccupation with procedural hurdles" that only complicate
the work of federal habeas courts).
16 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977),
expressly confirmed the Justices' commitment to Brown v. Allen, the primary precedent for
plenary habeas adjudication. Id. at 87. See note 7 supra.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982) provides:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.
The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the
district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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Although that statute has been read on many occasions to contemplate
(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for
hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of
Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United
States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for
an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign
state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law
of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
(d) Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgement and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or
more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the
district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within
which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such
district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district court
for hearing and determination.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) provides:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an
officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or
other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the
applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
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substantive reexamination of state court judgments on federal issues,18 it
was enacted over a hundred years ago when the scope of habeas was a
mere hint of what it is today. 19 Section 2241 has countenanced substantial, judicially crafted expansion of the writ, and some have argued that it
would tolerate judicial manipulation in the opposite direction. 20
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court
proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of
the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more
of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive,
is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless
the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such
factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
(e) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such State
court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made
therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to produce such part of the record,
then the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct
the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official. If the State cannot
provide such pertinent part of the record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's factual
determination.
(f) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of
such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable
written indicia showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding.
18See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963). Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 252-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing the prevailing construction but
arguing against it).
19 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
20 In his opinion for the Court in Wainwright, 433 U.S. 72, Justice Rehnquist noted the
Court's "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ,
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." Id.
at 81. More recently, the Court has refused to entertain some claims in federal proceedings
attacking federal convictions and sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 184-90 (1979); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979). The Court has
done so although the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), states clearly that such judg-
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I mean to propose an alternative explanation for habeas. Properly
conceived, the writ is not a procedural vehicle for the protection of physical liberty, available in circumstances identified at common law, but an
instrument of governmental administration employed to distribute authority and responsibility between courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
Habeas survives because of its relation to the often-denied but deeply
held idea that state criminal defendants are entitled to litigate their federal claims in a federal forum other than the Supreme Court.
This is not, of course, to propose a right to litigate originally in the
federal courts. State criminal defendants can be required to defer their
requests for federal relief until after their claims have been considered by
the state courts in the course of the criminal proceedings against them.
Habeas corpus identifies the occasions on which federal litigation is warranted notwithstanding prior state court treatment of the same federal
issues. The conventional explanation for habeas appreciates the significance of relitigating federal claims but mistakes the reason for it. Relitigation in habeas is appropriate not because petitioners' interest in
physical liberty justifies an exemption from ordinary preclusion rules, but
because criminal defendants in state court are not permitted to remove
their cases to federal court when they have federal claims to raise in their
defense. Because there is no opportunity for removal, it is essential that
postconviction habeas be available to ensure the choice of a federal forum-at some point.
This alternative explanation for habeas is prescriptive, for I will argue that removal is, and should be, denied to criminal defendants not
simply out of deference to state interests, but also to preserve individual
liberty. If the making and enforcement of substantive criminal law were
to come under centralized authority, it would be less difficult for the
criminal law to be employed as an organ of repression. Accordingly,
responsibility for fashioning and implementing substantive criminal law
should be lodged at the local level. The same concerns are inapposite
regarding the enforcement of procedural safeguards in criminal cases.
With respect to procedural rights guaranteed by federal law, individual
freedom is best served by resting authoritative judgment with the federal
courts.
In Part I, I criticize the conventional understanding that collateral
review in habeas is occasioned by state criminal defendants' interest in
physical liberty and argue that habeas can be explained more satisfactorily as a vehicle for according state criminal defendants an opportunity
ments may be challenged if prisoners are held in violation of "the Constitution or laws of the
United States." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 548-49 n.18 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(making these points in support of his view that the Court could restrict habeas to "instances
of fundamental unfairness" without running afoul of § 2241).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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for federal adjudication of federal claims. I discuss in Part II various
criticisms of postconviction habeas and proposals for change, in particular Professor Bator's proposal that habeas be governed by a "process"
model. In Part III, I offer an alternative explanation for habeas, which
accounts both for the availability of the federal forum and for the postponement of federal adjudication until after the state courts have completed their work. Finally, in Part IV, I describe the crosscurrents
among habeas, the Younger v. Harris2 1 line of cases, and the preclusion
cases, and discuss reformulations of current habeas doctrine that would
be appropriate under my proposed explanation for habeas. 22
I
THE CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATION

Habeas corpus historically has been explained as a procedural safeguard for personal liberty. The rationale underlying postconviction
habeas in the federal forum is that the individual's interest in freedom
from unlawful detention warrants a second look at federal claims already
rejected by the state courts. 23 Not every would-be litigant is entitled to
21 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
22 I will not address the question whether the Justices employ the structural notion of
federalism to achieve substantive ends. Undoubtedly, judicial attempts to further substantive
policies often are disguised in the language of federalism. See generally B. Marshall, Federalism and Civil Rights (1964); Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the
Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 723 (1979). The assignment of authority to the
state courts may well produce outcomes more palatable to the conservative wing of the Court.
See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1106 (1977) (arguing that state
judges are less likely than federal judges to be receptive to federal constitutional rights). Chief
Justice Burger's outburst in Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983), illustrates the point. The
full Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in that case on the ground that the state court had
rested its decision excluding evidence from a criminal trial upon state law. One might have
expected the Chief Justice to be pleased that a state court had found local law controlling and
that the Supreme Court was not called upon to second-guess the disposition of a state criminal
case. His reaction was, however, anything but sympathetic. Although he concurred in the
Court's judgment, he wrote separately to make clear that the "untoward" result in Casal
should be ascribed entirely to Florida law and, it seems, the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at
637. He pointed out that the Florida Constitution had recently been amended to track the
fourth amendment and that, accordingly, the Florida courts would "no longer be able to rely
on the State Constitution to suppress evidence that would be admissible under the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 638. Moreover, to the extent the judgment
below might have rested upon a state statute, the Chief Justice advised "the people of Florida
and their representatives" that they were free to repeal that statute in order to avoid its "burden" on law enforcement officers in the future. Id. at 639. Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
in Casal may indicate his disappointment that federal deference to state court decisionmaking
had not produced a substantive result that the Court's decisions, channeling issues to the state
courts, had been intended to produce.
23 See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1477; Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1073 (1970) [hereinafter Habeas Developments]. I have reported as much:
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relitigation. The subject matter jurisdiction of the habeas courts is limited explicitly to petitions from applicants who allege they are in "custody" in violation of federal law.2 4 The modem "custody" requirement
has ancient roots, bearing a correlative relation to the function of the writ
in the seventeenth century-to secure the release of persons who were
wrongfully confined. 25 Applicants for the writ had to be in some form of
"custody" from which they could be discharged. The "custody" requirement is, then, no mere artificial prerequisite to a habeas action, designed
to restrict access to those most in need of judicial attention. It is part and
parcel of what habeas corpus is, what it means, or, at least, what it has
26
been and meant traditionally.
Today, it is accurate to say that "custody" reflects the delicate balance in collateral
proceedings between the individual's interest in the protection of fundamental rights on
the one hand and societal interests in federalism and the finality of judgments on the
other. Simply put, the requirement of "custody" identifies those restraints upon individual liberty that are severe enough to justify the exercise of the extraordinary federal
habeas jurisdiction.
L. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies § 42, at 178 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (footnotes omitted). I
do not repent of my own summary of conventional thinking, yet I hope in this essay to demonstrate its inadequacy and to offer an alternative.
24 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1982). The Court usually includes a reference to the importance of
"custody" in its boilerplate regarding the place of the writ. For example, in Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982), the Court noted that
"past decisions have limited the writ's availability to challenges to state-court judgments in
situations where-as a result of a state-court criminal conviction-a petitioner has suffered
substantial restraints not shared by the public generally." In Hensley v. Municipal Court, San
Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973), the Court stated:
The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the
writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty ... [I]ts
use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for
cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.
And, in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963):
Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is
inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. For
its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the
individual is entitled to his immediate release.
25 See generally W. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 287-306 (1980); D.
Meador, Habeas Corpus and Magna Carta (1966); R. Walker, The Constitutional and Legal
Development of Habeas Corpus as the Writ of Liberty (1960).
26 See Fay, 372 U.S. at 427 n.38; McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-38 (1934). Although
McNally's understanding of "custody" was rejected in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968),
see text accompanying notes 37-39 infra, the link between the writ and restraints on liberty has
never been severed. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) ("It is clear, not only
from the language of [the federal habeas statutes], but also from the common-law history of
the writ, that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality
of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody."); accord Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980).
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Within the framework of federal jurisdiction, however, the "custody" requirement does operate as a gate-keeping device. It screens cases
according to the nature of the individual interests at stake, limiting reliti27
gation to cases in which petitioners allege unlawful restraints on liberty.
Petitioners who complain that they have been ordered to pay unlawful
fines, for example, are excluded. 28 Likewise, the "custody" requirement
screens petitions according to when petitioners request federal relief.
Only applicants who are in "custody" at the time of filing are heard.
Those who are not yet threatened with detention 29 or who have been
unconditionally discharged from past confinement 30 are not entitled to
31
pursue the writ.
27 Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.
28 Hanson v. Circuit Court of First Judicial Circuit, 591 F.2d 404, 405 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979). But see Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343
(2d Cir.) (dictum) (suggesting that habeas may be available where petitioners have only paid a
$10 fine if they show "possible adverse collateral effects" of their conviction), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1093 (1974); cf. Pueschel v. Leuba, 383 F. Supp. 576, 580 (D. Conn. 1974) (noting that
Thistlethwaite may have cast some doubt on, but cannot be regarded as an abandonment of,
the "custody" requirement). The Supreme Court has not considered the question directly, but
it seems likely that the Justices would not approve relitigation when the applicant stands only
to recoup financial losses. Compare Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that "custody" did not exist where the litigant
had only been fined) with Jones v. United States, 419 U.S. 907, 910 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a distinction between prisoners and persons sentenced to pay fines constitutes a denial of equal protection).
29 See, e.g., Brewster v. Secretary of U.S. Army, 489 F. Supp. 85, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding damage to reputation insufficient to warrant habeas review). Cf. Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982) (explaining earlier cases as involving
the "imminent" threat of arrest).
30 See, e.g., Carter v. Hardy, 526 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838
(1976).
31 It occasionally happens that a previous conviction, the sentence for which has been
served, nonetheless continues to influence a litigant's current status. See, e.g., Loper v. Beto,
405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972) (involving use of a prior conviction to impeach the testimony of a
litigant in a subsequent and unrelated prosecution); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
448-49 (1972) (involving a sentencing judge's reliance upon prior convictions to enhance the
sentence for a subsequent and unrelated conviction). In circumstances of that kind, the validity of the prior conviction can be challenged in a habeas attack upon the new conviction or
sentence-based on the theory that use of an invalid prior judgment constitutes new and independent federal error. The result, of course, is a belated attack on the prior conviction itself.
In some instances, courts have permitted petitioners to challenge previous convictions straightforwardly in these circumstances, apparently on the theory that their effect upon applicants'
current detention constitutes "custody" for habeas purposes. See, e.g., Jackson v. Louisiana,
452 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1971). Compare Escobedo v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that an attack on a previous conviction is permissible if there is a" 'possibility. . . [of]
collateral legal consequences' ") (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968)) with
Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 450-51 n.22 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that it is "unsettled" in the
Fifth Circuit whether the use of a prior conviction for sentence enhancement alone satisfies the
"custody" requirement for an assault on the former conviction itself), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1056 (1983). See generally Note, Sentencing, Due Process, and Invalid Prior Convictions: The
Aftermath of United States v. Tucker, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1099 (1977); Comment, Due Process
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As a docket control mechanism, the "custody" doctrine has come
under enormous pressure to give way in the interest of providing meaningful relitigation opportunities to applicants. 3 2 A few common illustrations will suffice. Habeas petitioners need time after trial to marshal their
federal claims, exhaust state remedies, and frame their contentions for
federal adjudication. In order to ensure that habeas applicants have that
time, the Court held in Jones v. Cunningham33 that the constraints associated with parole constitute "custody" for habeas purposes. 34 A contrary decision would have required dismissal for want of subject matter
jurisdiction when a petitioner is released on parole before federal review
is concluded 35 and thus would have made a shambles of postconviction
habeas.3 6 Approaching the same practical problem from the other direcat Sentencing: Implementing the Rule of United States v. Tucker, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111
(1977).
32 Physical incarceration itself is no longer necessary. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal
Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 349 (1973) (finding restraints attending
bail or personal recognizance sufficient to constitute custody); see also Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 241-43 (1963) (parole); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 425 n.1 (9th Cir.
1978) (probation); Walker v. North Carolina, 262 F. Supp. 102, 104-05 (W.D.N.C. 1966) (suspended sentence), aff'd per curiam, 372 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967).
See generally Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Concept of Custody and Access to Federal
Court, 53 J. Urb. L. 61 (1975).
33 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
34 Id. at 241-43. Justice Black's opinion for the Court noted that the conditions routinely
placed on parolees, and the possibility that they can be "rearrested at any time" if parole
authorities believe they have violated parole conditions, are enough to keep parolees in the
"custody" of the parole board. Id. at 242-43. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972) (holding that parole revocation hearings need not respect all the procedural safeguards
that are essential to due process in criminal trials).
35 There was a time when a prisoner's release from physical incarceration was thought not
only to foreclose habeas jurisdiction for want of "custody," but also to render her claims moot
and thus beyond the reach of a federal court even on direct review. See, e.g., Parker v. Ellis,
362 U.S. 574, 575-76 (1960) (per curiam) (habeas); St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42
(1943) (per curiam) (direct review). In the wake of Jones, however, the Court adopted the
view that at least some collateral consequences stemming from criminal convictions can maintain an appellant's "stake in the outcome" of federal litigation well after release from actual
incarceration. See, e.g., Sibron, 392 U.S. at 50; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 n.2
(1968). In Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), the Court extended that view to habeas,
id. at 237-38, and held that the writ is available to litigants who have been discharged from
parole, so long as the habeas petition was filed while the petitioner was still in "custody"
within the meaning of Jones. Id. at 238-40. See also Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830, 833 n.4
(1985) (holding that possible future use of a conviction for impeachment or sentence enhancement constituted sufficient collateral consequences to avoid mootness). Cf. Lane v. Williams,
455 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1982) (suggesting that "nonstatutory consequences" are insufficient to
avoid mootness in a habeas case).
36 Justice Black's rhetoric in Jones revealed the Court's objective:
Of course, [the habeas corpus] writ always could and still can reach behind prison
walls and iron bars. But it can do more. It is not now and never has been a static,
narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints
upon their liberty.
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tion in Peyton v. Rowe,3 7 the Court held that a petitioner is in the "custody" of a future, challenged sentence scheduled to be served after the
completion of a current, unchallenged term.38 If the law were otherwise,
the petitioner would have to delay a habeas attack on a future sentence
until she begins serving it. Such a postponement would not only subject
successful petitioners to a period of unlawful detention while the petition
is being heard, but would premise federal adjudication upon a needlessly
cold record. 39 Finally, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas
Judicial District,4° the Court held that petitioners free on bail after trial
are nonetheless in "custody" for habeas purposes. 4 1 These three decisions both underscore the Court's intention to define "custody" in a way
that assures an effective postconviction remedy 42 and provide the ammu371 U.S. at 243.
37 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
38 Id. at 67. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court chose to view the prisoners in
Peyton to be in the "custody" of an aggregate term embracing both their present, unchallenged
and the future, challenged sentences. Id. at 64.
39 Id. at 62-64.
40 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
41 Id. at 348-53. See also Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805, 180910 (1984) (finding "custody" where the petitioner had been permitted to remain at large pending trial de novo). Cf. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920) (holding that preconviction bail
is not "custody" for habeas purposes).
42 The Court has recently stated this point explicitly. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420, 430 (1984) (acknowledging that "custody" has been "defined broadly to effectuate the
purposes of the [habeas] writ"). There are still circumstances, however, in which the "custody" doctrine precludes jurisdiction even though failure to grant habeas interferes with the
orderly review of petitioners' federal claims. The best illustrations arise when more than one
state is involved. For example, a petitioner confined in Kansas under an unchallenged sentence imposed by a Kansas court may seek to challenge another, yet-to-be-served sentence
imposed by a Missouri court. In such a case, the petitioner clearly is in "custody" for purposes
of the writ if the Missouri authorities have issued a "detainer" or "hold order," notifying the
Kansas warden that they intend to enforce the Missouri sentence against the petitioner after
the completion of his present, Kansas term. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410
U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973) (involving an application for habeas in advance of trial in another
state). The Court is prepared to ascribe the Kansas warden's physical "custody" of the petitioner to the Missouri authorities. Id. at 489 n.4. Accordingly, the petitioner is permitted to
seek habeas review either in the appropriate federal district court in Missouri, challenging the
Missouri sentence straightforwardly, Braden, 410 U.S. at 499 n.15, or to seek relief in a district
court in Kansas, attacking any additional restraints imposed by the Kansas warden because of
the Missouri "detainer." See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1970). In either instance, the "detainer" establishes "custody" for subject matter jurisdiction in habeas. If, however, the authorities in Missouri fail to lodge a "detainer" with the Kansas warden, there is no
tangible connection between the prisoner's present custodian and those responsible for the
sentence outstanding in Missouri. The Supreme Court has not addressed this problem, see
Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 n.4, and the lower courts are divided. Compare Shelton v. Meier, 485
F.2d 1177, 1178 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding a "detainer" crucial) with Clonce v. Presley, 640 F.2d
271, 273 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding it inconsequential that parole authorities had lodged no
"detainer" with the federal authorities holding the petitioner). As a matter of policy, it seems
apparent that the availability of federal litigation should not turn upon the formality of a
"detainer." If it is clear, and it is, that the petitioner would be permitted to attack a future
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nition for occasional arguments that the "custody" requirement should
43
be discarded entirely.
Arguments for the abandonment of the "custody" doctrine are powerful. Other extraordinary writs in the federal system, notably coram
nobis,44 may be employed in collateral proceedings irrespective of
whether the applicant remains under restraint. 45 Nor do similar state
46
court remedies require petitioners to be in "custody" as a precondition.
Retention of the "custody" requirement in habeas is hardly essential to
maintain the traditional relation between habeas and a particular form of
Kansas sentence scheduled for service after the completion of his present term, it seems

equally clear that the same result should be reached when another state is concerned, regardless of whether the authorities in that state are in formal contact with the Kansas warden.
Nevertheless, in order to reach that result the Court would have to dilute the "custody" requirement yet again. Furthermore, the interplay of the habeas "custody" doctrine, a question
of subject matter jurisdiction, and the requisites of ordinary, personal jurisdiction of adverse
parties in federal proceedings causes additional, and perplexing, difficulty in interjurisdictional
cases. See generally Comment, Habeas Corpus: Interstate Detainers and In Personam Jurisdiction, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 215 (1976); Comment, Interstate Detainers and Federal Habeas
Corpus: Long-Arm Shortcut to Solving the Catch 2241, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 863.
43 See, e.g., Comment, Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Review of State Convictions, 14 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 465 (1981).
44 Coram nobis is an extraordinary writ available at common law to correct alleged errors
of fact. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954). It is authorized by the "all-writs"
section of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982), which provides that "the Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
Morgan, 346 U.S. at 502.
45 See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510-11. The routine postconviction remedy for prisoners still in
"custody" who wish to challenge federal judgments is a motion to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982). But if a litigant fails to meet the "custody" requirement of
§ 2255, courts will treat the proceeding as a petition for a writ of coram nobis. E.g., United
States v. Correa-De Jesus, 708 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983); Carbo v. United States, 581
F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1978). There are hints in some cases that the scope of coram nobis is
narrow and that litigants may lose something in the move from § 2255. E.g., United States v.
Morgan, 39 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (warning that coram nobis is "not merely a
means of evading the jurisdictional prerequisites of a section 2255 motion"). Yet most courts
seem to assume that coram nobis is essentially interchangeable with § 2255, the only difference
being the inconvenient "custody" requirement attaching to the latter. See, e.g., United States
v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1173 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974); Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444,
451 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973). The result, of course, is that the
"custody" requirement in § 2255 proceedings is rendered meaningless. Cf. Polizzi v. United
States, 550 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding coram nobis available to a corporation, which
could not be held in "custody").
46 E.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 440.10-.30 (McKinney 1983); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30.
Indeed, both the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have recommended that state postconviction remedies be freed of any
requirement that applicants be in "custody." Standards for Criminal Justice § 22-2.3 (2d ed.
1980); Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act § 1, 11 U.L.A. 485-86 (1974). See Cohen,
Post-Conviction Relief in the New York Court of Appeals: New Wine and Broken Bottles, 35
Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 25-26 (1968) (attributing the New York courts' preference for coram nobis
over habeas corpus, at least in part, to the inconvenience of the "custody" requirement attending the latter).
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relief-release from detention. Applicants who win habeas relief from
the conditions of parole or bail are in no obvious way released from physical detention. Officials responsible for their supervision are simply instructed to cease enforcement of such conditions. 47 Similarly, petitioners
who use habeas to avoid future, as yet unserved sentences obtain relief in
a form akin to ordinary injunctions. State authorities are instructed to
strike references to invalid sentences from relevant state records. 48 Inasmuch as such petitioners may continue to be held under a current, unchallenged sentence, habeas relief regarding a future sentence does not
necessarily contemplate immediate release. 49 The long association between habeas and personal liberty could be acknowledged, it may be argued, even if the "custody" requirement were abandoned and the federal
courts' jurisdiction were brought into symmetry with their modem authority to fashion relief appropriate to the circumstances at bar.
Despite these cogent arguments, the "custody" doctrine proves resilient, primarily as a basis for distinguishing federal claims entitled to
relitigation from those for which only original federal court jurisdiction
is available.5 0 "Custody" functions, on a nonconstitutional level, similarly to the "injury in fact" requirement for adjudication in an article III
court. The "injury in fact" standard delineates disputes within the constitutional jurisdiction of federal courts generally, 5 1 whereas the "cus47 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968) (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236
(1963)). The habeas court may allow state authorities time in which to cure federal error and,
if they do so, the habeas action will be dismissed. See Dennis v. Solem, 690 F.2d 145, 147 (8th
Cir. 1982); see also Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
944 (1980). If, however, curative action is not taken seasonably, the habeas court may order
state authorities to "release" the petitioner from further parole supervision. See Bulger v.
McClay, 575 F.2d 407, 411 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978).
48 See, e.g., Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709, 719 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
49 Peyton, 391 U.S. at 66 (recognizing as much but insisting that the federal habeas courts
have power to "fashion appropriate relief other than immediate release"). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 Rule 2(b) (1982) (instructing applicants attacking future "custody" to include a prayer
for "appropriate relief").
50 E.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (denying a
litigant with a first amendment claim access to a federal court by according "full faith and
credit" to a prior state court judgment on the theory that the litigant might have raised her
first amendment claim in state court); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)
(invoking the "full faith and credit" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), to foreclose relitigation
of a civil rights claim). Cf. Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to
the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 859, 873 n.76 (1976) (questioning the notion that relitigation
should be allowed in habeas cases but disallowed in civil rights cases). It is well settled that
habeas represents an express, statutory exception both to § 1738 and to ordinary preclusion
rules. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485 n.27.
51 Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (finding no standing where the
plaintiff organization failed to allege that any of its members was actually injured by the action
under attack) with United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973) (resting a determination of standing on the plaintiff organization's allegations
of noneconomic injury).
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tody" doctrine divides cases justiciable under article III into two further
categories: those in which federal adjudication must come initially, if at
all, and those in which it may await preliminary litigation in state court.
The explanation that "custody" provides for relitigation in habeas is
as weak as it is essential to the conventional understanding of the writ.
Given that there must be a line between claims that can only be entertained originally and those that can be raised collaterally in the federal

forum, it is entirely unclear why that line should be where the "custody"
requirement draws it. A petitioner who is incarcerated clearly has a
greater interest in relitigation of a federal claim than, for example, a petitioner who wishes to raise the same issue but who seeks only reimbursement for a ten-dollar fine.52 It is hardly so clear, however, that a
petitioner who files a petition the day before a parole term expires has a
greater interest in relitigation than one who faces an enormous fine
scheduled for payment in installments for the foreseeable future. It is
possible to blame the modem Court's dilution of the "custody" require-

ment for its inability persuasively to distinguish cases involving other,
important individual interests. A return to the physical detention standard would, however, neglect the reasons why the Justices have inter53
preted the "custody" requirement as they have.
The "custody" explanation is weak for entirely different reasons.
First, the historical requirement that habeas applicants be in "custody"
was never intended to identify litigants who should be permitted to relitigate claims.5 4 Indeed, the extent to which habeas was available after trial
at common law remains a controversial question.5 5 Petitioners in England were allowed to file repetitive applications for the habeas writ.5 6
52 But cf. Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (suggesting that
habeas corpus relief may be sought by a petitioner whose punishment was a $10 fine), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974). That the substantive issue in Thistlethwaite was an important
first amendment challenge to a city licensing scheme, the very kind of issue on which federal
adjudication seems most desirable, only underscores the inadequacy of the "custody" doctrine
to determine the availability of the federal forum. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(exercising appellate jurisdiction to review a free exercise clause claim advanced by Amish
parents who had suffered $5 fines for keeping their children home from school). See also Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1477 (asking rhetorically whether the distinction between "criminal cases ending in custody and all other cases" can be justified).
-53 See text accompanying notes 32-43 supra.
54 See W. Duker, supra note 25, at 288.
55 Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-415 (1963) (interpreting the historical materials to show that habeas was available to attack judicial orders of detention) with id. at 449-63
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (taking a substantially more circumscribed view). See Oaks, Legal
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 458-68 (1966) (taking issue
with the Noia majority).
56 The most famous rendition of the common law rule came in Cox v. Hakes, 15 App. Cas.
506 (1890), in which the House of Lords acknowledged that "[a] person detained in custody
might. . proceed from court to court until he obtained his liberty." Id. at 527 (Lord Her-

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:991

Yet the rationale for that rule is unclear. One possible explanation is that
a decision unfavorable to the petitioner was thought not to be an adjudication at all, but a mere refusal to act.5 7 An alternative explanation for
allowing petitioners to submit successive habeas petitions is tied to the
absence of appellate review.5 8 English judges may have considered
habeas to be a summary proceeding giving rise to no reviewable judgment. Because only judgments subject to review were given preclusive
effect, habeas decisions could not bar further applications for relief.5 9
There is no indication, in any case, that successive litigation was permissible in habeas because of the applicant's detention. The Supreme Court
came to the "custody" explanation for relitigation only recently and in
aid of judicial policies forged independently. 6° On reflection, the Court's
schell, J.). Accord Ex parte Partington, 153 Eng. Rep. 284, 286 (Ex. 1845) (stating that "[t]he
defendant.
has a right to the opinion of every court as to the propriety of his imprisonment"); Burdett v. Abbot, 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 535 (K.B. 1811); King v. Suddis, 102 Eng. Rep.
119, 122 (K.B. 1801). See also W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus § 389g,
at 601 (2d ed. 1893) (reporting that prisoners could move from a single judge to the full court
and then on to another court); Gordon, Habeas Corpus-Right of Applicant to Apply to All
Judges of Same Court, 7 Can. B. Rev. 50, 53 (1929) (criticizing the ability of prisoners to
"canvass judges" and finding it "surely unsatisfactory that although a dozen judges think a
criminal ought not to be at large, their decisions may be nullified by the wrong-headedness of a
thirteenth judge").
57 Gordon, supra note 56, at 52.
58 Ex parte Savarkar, [1910] 2 K.B. 1056, 1063. Nor could direct review be obtained by
writ of error. R. Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus 195 (1976); Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus:
A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179, 189 (1948).
59 See R. Sharpe, supra note 58, at 194-203; Gordon, The Unruly Writ of Habeas Corpus,
26 Mod. L. Rev. 520, 523 (1963). The view that only judgments reviewable on writ of error
could be given preclusive effect can be traced to Lord Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case, 8
Coke 114a, 121a (1609). See also The Case of the City of London, 8 Coke 121b, 127b-128a
(1609).
60 The problem was framed most apparently in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963),
a case involving the preclusive effect of prior postconviction proceedings in the federal forum.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the historical rule that preclusion
rules are inapplicable in habeas may have rested on want of appellate review. Implicitly, at
least, he recognized as well that the modem availability of appeals in habeas might, in turn,
undercut the traditional rule. In response, he shifted rationales:
It has been suggested .
that this principle [the inapplicability of preclusion in
habeas) derives from the fact that at common law habeas corpus judgments were not
appealable. But its roots would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged. If "government. .. [is] always [to] be accountable to the judiciary for
a man's imprisonment,". . access to the courts on habeas must not be thus impeded.
The inapplicability of resjudicatato habeas, then, is inherent in the very role and function of the writ.
Id. at 8 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963)) (emphasis added). Dissenting in
Sanders, Justice Harlan would have accorded prior judgments a greater measure of respect,
even in habeas. Yet on the critical question of interest here, he was in full agreement with the
Court:
At the outset, there is one straw man that should be removed from this case. The
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use of "custody" to explain its innovations in habeas appears more expedient than principled. In the typical judicial manner, the Court has borrowed an idea from the past and refashioned it into a device for resolving
a current problem quite unrelated to the reasons that gave birth to the
doctrine in the first instance. This is not to suggest illegitimacy, but only
to account for employment of the "custody" requirement as a matter of
convenience.
More important, the "custody" requirement was never intended to
resolve the uniquely American question whether relitigation, if war61
ranted at all, should be undertaken in federal rather than state court.
Emphasis on criminal defendants' interest in personal liberty may make
at least some rough sense if the question is whether to relitigate claims
within a single judicial system. 62 It is vastly more doubtful that "custody" offers a rational standard when the issue is whether the federal
63
courts should become involved in the treatment of litigants' claims.
Court is at great pains to develop the theme that denial of a prisoner's application for
collateral relief is not resjudicata. But the Government recognizes, as indeed it must in
view of the decisions, that strict doctrines of resjudicata do not apply in this field. The
consequences of injustice-loss of liberty and sometimes loss of life-are far too great to
permit the automatic application of an entire body of technical rules whose primary
relevance lies in the area of civil litigation.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Both Justice Brennan and Justice Harlan thus rested the habeas
writ's exemption from preclusion rules not upon the historical rationales, nor upon the nature
of the claims that prisoners might present in habeas, but upon "custody." Neither cited any
authorities in point. Indeed, the absence of precedents makes the truth rather clear. Sensing a
need for a way to distinguish habeas from other actions, the Justices simply chose "custody."
Justice Brennan's citation to Noia is most telling. The Court had decided, perhaps as early as
Brown but surely by the time of Noia, that habeas should serve as a general postconviction
remedy. To make that decision meaningful, it was necessary in Sanders, delivered only a
month after Noia, to fashion a justification for perpetuating the writ's freedom from preclusion
rules even after historical rationales had become obsolete.
61 If the issue were whether the state courts should offer routine opportunities for the relitigation of claims already adjudicated at trial or on appeal in state court, the current debate
would be lively but hardly so heated. See Note, Effect of the Federal Constitution in Requiring
State Post-Conviction Remedies, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1143 (1953) (developing an argument that
the states are constitutionally bound to provide for state postconviction review).
62 Once again, Sanders, 373 U.S. 1, proves useful. The litigant in that case was a federal
prisoner attacking a federal conviction pursuant to § 2255. He had been denied relief on two
prior occasions. The Court refused to apply ordinary preclusion rules, relying on the prisoner's detention as an explanation. Id. at 8. The Sanders Court recognized, however, that
prisoners may occasionally harass their keepers deliberately by stringing out postconviction
litigation piecemeal. To contend with that difficulty, the Court fashioned guidelines for the
treatment of successive applications for federal collateral relief. Those guidelines, applicable in
both § 2255 and habeas cases, permit summary dismissal if prisoners "abuse" federal remedies.
Id. at 17. More recently, the same guidelines have been incorporated into the habeas and
§ 2255 rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1982); id. § 2255 Rule 9(b).
63 There is no question but that the Court understands "custody" to explain not only relitigation, see text accompanying notes 27-31 supra, but relitigation in federal court. Dissenting
in Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 n.6 (1975), Justice Powell seized upon "custody" as the
distinguishing characteristic justifying collateral attacks in habeas: "In my view, the harm
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Habeas is no stranger to interjurisdictional conflict. The writ was used
by the central courts in England to draw cases away from the local and
manorial courts and to challenge each other for primacy. 64 The Supreme
Court's use of habeas in the middle decades of this century to implement
its innovations in criminal procedure is, then, hardly surprising. Indeed,
the Warren Court's key decisions in 196365 are only recent American
illustrations of the writ's usefulness in reordering the distribution of judicial authority and responsibility. 66 The establishment of collateral review
through habeas did not represent a brazen grab for national power at the
expense of the states, but rather an attempt to ensure the enforcement of
unpopular substantive principles that the state courts might not respect. 67 The Justices knew they could not superintend fifty state supreme
courts by means of direct review and therefore turned to the lower federal courts as surrogates. 68 Because those courts lacked jurisdiction to
review state court judgments directly, their theoretical power to issue the
writ of habeas corpus was refurbished to justify involvement at the postconviction stage. 69 The Court's "procedural" decisions in the Warren
asserted in habeas corpus proceedings-restraint on liberty-may justify a broader scope of
collateral attack than would the kinds of injury normally concerned in actions under § 1983."
Elaborating on the same theme in his opinion for the Court in Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982), Justice Powell concluded that children in foster
homes are not in "custody" for purposes of a parent's next friend habeas attack on the state
court judgment terminating parental rights. The gravamen of the mother's complaint was not,
according to Justice Powell, that the physical liberty of her children was being restricted, but
that her own parental rights had been violated. Id. at 511. It was clear in Lehman that if the
mother had simply filed a civil rights action against responsible state authorities, she would
have been met by a preclusion defense. Her federal claim (against the validity of the state
statute governing the termination of parental rights) had been decided against her in state
court. She had pursued the federal writ for the very purpose of avoiding collateral estoppel.
The maneuver was unsuccessful for failure to slip over the line, drawn by the "custody" doctrine, between cases in which federal collateral attack is available and cases in which it is not.
But see note 217 infra (discussing the exceptions to preclusion apart from habeas). At the
outset, Justice Powell addressed the "custody" issue forthrightly, attempting to distinguish
apparently relevant precedents. 458 U.S. at 509-11. In the end, however, he turned candidly
to federalism as yet another value protected by the "custody" requirement. See id. at 512-14.
In this vein, he distinguished some precedents in which "custody" had been found, but in
which there were no federalism concerns. Id. at 508 n.9 (refusing to find authoritative cases in
which federal prisoners had attacked prior federal judgments).
64 See 9 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 109-11 (4th ed. 1926); R. Walker, supra
note 25, at 22-25.
65 See note 7 supra.
66 See D. Meador, supra note 25.
67 See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale
L.J. 1035, 1041 (1977).
68 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Haynsworth,
Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate System, 59 Cornell L.
Rev. 597, 601 (1974). See also note 137 infra.
69 See Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for
Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 943, 960 (1976) (relating the expansion of
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period seem plainly to have been designed to allow state criminal defendants an opportunity to litigate their federal claims in the federal
forum. 70

In sum, it was the nature of litigants' federal claims, rather than
their interest in raising them, that motivated the Justices' decisions making postconviction habeas generally available. The writ's association
with personal liberty made it an entirely appropriate vehicle for the
Court's strategy to protect individuals from recalcitrant state authorities.

Yet the "custody" requirement was merely a traditional component of
habeas. It quickly gave ground whenever it threatened to interfere with
71
the development of an effective system of federal postconviction review.
When habeas was recruited to new service for the protection of fourteenth amendment rights, "custody" offered an expedient and facially acceptable justification for federal judicial action notwithstanding previous
litigation in state court. It would have been nonsense, however, to take
"custody" seriously and actually to monitor the door to the federal forum on the basis of precedents regarding the meaning of "custody" for
habeas purposes. The coincidence would have been startling if such an
approach had produced satisfying answers to the entirely independent
question at hand-whether the federal courts should entertain federal
claims from state prisoners. 72 The Court never proposed or followed
that course, but blithely departed from the historical doctrine that habeas
applicants must be physically confined. 73 Today, "custody" serves a
postconviction habeas to the Supreme Court's inability to review "more than a handful of state
court decisions presenting a federal question").
70 "[I]t was the deprivation of constitutional rights that was to be avoided." Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 67, at 1046. See also Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword:
The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106-07 (1959) (reading Brown for this
proposition); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement
of Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 Va. L. Rev. 250, 259-60 (1974) (rejecting the "custody"
explanation). See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1472-77. During the same
period, the Court also experimented with opening the federal courts prior to the conclusion of
state proceedings, when litigants faced with prosecution sought prospective relief. See, e.g.,
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
71 See notes 32-43 and accompanying text supra.
72 Cf. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103, 1107 (1977) (taking a similar view of the
Court's use of ideas borrowed from equity to determine whether the federal courts should
enjoin state criminal proceedings).
73 The parental rights case, Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458
U.S. 502 (1982), illustrates the point. Justice Blackmun's dissent argued that habeas traditionally was used to free unlawfully confined children and that the children in that case were in
"custody" for habeas purposes. Id. at 516-23. Yet to no one's surprise the Court's majority
concluded otherwise. Justice Blackmun himself located an alternative, nonjurisdictional basis
for declining federal relitigation. Id. at 523-26 (contending that the district court had discretionary authority to dismiss the mother's petition on the ground that she was an inappropriate
"next friend" petitioner).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:991

symbolic function. It would be a serious mistake to believe that it offers a
sound basis for determining the availability of federal adjudication.
II
HABEAS AND ITS CRITICS

A.

Criticismsof Habeas

The inadequacy of the conventional explanation for habeas invites
criticism of federal collateral review generally. Because habeas allows
federal courts to decide issues seriatim, and because habeas petitions
often lack merit, critics have charged that habeas jurisdiction clogs federal calendars with frivolous claims and thus wastes valuable judicial resources. 74 Further, it is charged, the concentration of effort upon
numerous meritless petitions may thwart the vindication of the very federal rights sought to be protected by the writ. As Justice Jackson
warned, "[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be
buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a
needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth
the search."' 75 It is also argued that collateral review in the federal forum
produces friction between federal and state courts. 76 The latter may be
offended by the occasional award of habeas relief to prisoners whose federal claims were found wanting in state court. More generally, state
courts may resent federal, trial-level courts accepting habeas petitions
and thus undertaking to second-guess judgments that may have been affirmed by the states' highest courts. 77 The delays associated with habeas
are said to undercut the "finality" of state judgments 78 and, particularly
in death penalty cases, to frustrate state attempts to carry out constitu74 See, e.g., Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should
Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated?, 21 De Paul L. Rev. 740, 747 (1972). Contrary to popular
belief, the increase in the rate of prisoner filings in the past decade can be traced primarily to
civil rights actions rather than habeas petitions. The raw number of habeas actions and the
percentage of federal docket space claimed by them have actually declined since 197 1, a period
in which the prisoner population has skyrocketed. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Calif. L. Rev. 837, 83948 (1984).
75 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
76 E.g., Cooke, Waste Not, Wait Not-A Consideration of Federal and State Jurisdiction,
49 Fordham L. Rev. 895, 900 (1981) (condemning habeas as "[t]he most incessant abrader of
[state] judicial feelings"); McGowan, The View from an Inferior Court, 19 San Diego L. Rev.
659, 667 (1982) (insisting that habeas has "rankled relations between state and federal
courts").
77 C. Wright, supra note 1, at 344 (identifying "an affront to state sensibilities when a
single federal judge can order discharge of a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed by
the highest court of a state").
78 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
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tionally valid sentencing policies. 79
Habeas defenders have challenged these arguments on several
grounds.8 0 The costs of habeas are outweighed, it is argued, by the need
to protect individual rights."1 It may be true that most habeas petitions
are unsuccessful. 82 Yet even a poor success rate may be revealing when,
by hypothesis, the state courts have already rejected meritorious federal
claims. If the state courts are offended by habeas review, they may have
their own poor record to blame. 3 In addition, there are competing considerations outweighing the state interest in the "finality" of judgments.
The institutional settings of state and federal courts make it imperative
that the latter have the final word on federal iSSUeS. 84 Although habeas
takes time and occasionally requires the postponement of criminal sanctions, the treatment of substantial claims should not be frustrated by a
rush to judgment-particularly in death penalty cases. 85 The redundancy of habeas may produce better substantive analysis through a dialogue between state and federal courts. 8 6 If state judges have become
more sensitive to federal claims in recent years, it is arguably because of
the existence of federal habeas. 87 The writ's defenders have also argued
that, in many instances, habeas better protects federal rights than does
appellate review within a state system. Collateral review allows the federal courts to reach federal claims that counsel failed adequately to pursue. 8 8 Habeas also allows federal courts to treat federal claims apart
79 Cf. Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 555, 573 (pointing
out that death row prisoners have an incentive to employ whatever habeas remedies are available to them-for the obvious reason that time-consuming litigation may keep them alive).
80 The best early defenses of the Supreme Court's expansion of habeas include Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great
Writ, 66 Yale L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State
Prisoners, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 461 (1960); Habeas Corpus-Proposals for Reform, 9 Utah L.
Rev. 18, 27 (1964) (remarks of Professor Paul Freund) [hereinafter Utah Symposium].
81 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1956) ("it is
not a needle we are looking for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human being").
82 P. Robinson, An Empirical Study of Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court
Judgments 14 (1979); Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. 321, 368-69 (1973).
83 See Oliver, Postconviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge-Revisited, 45
F.R.D. 199, 221-25 (1968) (finding that the development of habeas was necessary in view of
the state courts' poor record).
84 Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
579, 663-69 (1982).
85 See Goldberg, The Supreme Court Reaches Out and Touches Someone-Fatally, 10
Hastings Const. L.Q. 7 (1982) (arguing that excessive speed in death penalty cases prompts
recollections of the Rosenberg episode).
86 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 67.
87 Yackle, Book Review, 36 Rutgers L. Rev. 375, 379 (1983).
88 See Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 Va. L.
Rev. 286, 287-88 (1966).
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from both state procedural rules89 and the inevitable focus in state court
upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. 90 Finally, habeas allows
courts to extend their consideration of claims to allegations outside the
state court record 91 and to apply new constitutional decisions
92
retroactively.
B. Proposalsfor Change
Dissatisfaction with the conventional explanation for habeas has
also generated a variety of proposals to abolish or to revise federal collateral review. Some abolitionists would discard postconviction habeas in
favor of adjudication in state court, followed by direct review in the
Supreme Court. 93 Others suggest that if the Court lacks the physical
capacity both to meet its institutional responsibilities and to act as a
court of error in state criminal cases, 94 the federal courts of appeal
should be recruited to service in place of the district courts sitting in
95
habeas.
Proposals to revise habeas take several forms. Justice Stevens would
allow relief only when habeas applicants raise "fundamental" constitutional claims that go to the "validity of the underlying judgment itself"
or to "the integrity of the process by which that judgment was ob89 Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 78 (1964).
90 Habeas Developments, supra note 23, at 1060-61. See also Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 802-03 (1965).
91 See Habeas Developments, supra note 23, at 1113.
92 See Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 (1965) (discussing the
Court's power to limit the retroactive effect of its decisions); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (1966).
93 See, e.g., Robinson, Proposal and Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal
Judgments, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 485 (1974).
94 See note 137 infra.
95 Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 273
(1983); see also P. Carrington, D. Meador & M. Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 103-14 (1976);
D. Meador, Criminal Appeals 178-84 (1973). Others have advanced similar proposals. See,
e.g., Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a Proposal for a National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 545, 558-74; Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of Justice, 59
A.B.A. J. 841 (1973) (proposing a "national court of appeals" of limited jurisdiction); see also
Haynsworth, supra note 68, at 604-07. A presidential commission established by the Nixon
Administration embraced the idea. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Courts 128-31 (1973). Ms. Hufstedler would eliminate federal direct review
of state court denials of postconviction relief and channel the direct review of criminal convictions in the first instance to a new national court situated between the existing courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court. She would, however, leave federal habeas corpus as it is. Hufstedler,
Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
841, 852-54 (1972).
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tained. ' '96 Claims tied imaginatively to the fringes of the Bill of Rights
should, in his view, be left to the state courts or to the Supreme Court
exercising its appellate jurisdiction. 97 Other revisers insist that habeas
should be limited to cases in which the applicant's "factual guilt" is seriously in issue. 98 Judge Friendly focused upon the individual petitioner at
bar and would have denied habeas consideration of any claim in the absence of a colorable allegation of innocence. 99 By contrast, Justice
Powell focuses not on the arguable innocence of the particular applicant,

but on the nature of the federal claim asserted. 00 On his analysis, claims
that by their nature have little to do with protecting the factually innocent from wrongful conviction should be excluded from habeas. 0 1 Still
others find a ready vehicle for change in the relationship between habeas
corpus and the retroactive effect of new constitutional decisions. Justice
Harlan would have disposed of a fair share of habeas claims by instructing the federal courts to apply the law as it existed at the time of
96 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens suggests as models for habeas consideration the "classic" cases in which the petitioner's trial was
dominated by a mob or the conviction was obtained through the use of perjured or extorted
testimony. Id.
97 Id. at 543; see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 124 n.3 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
98 The term in this context connotes confidence that the petitioner engaged in the conduct
proscribed by the relevant criminal statute with the requisite level of culpability and in circumstances demonstrating no available defense. Cf. Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 19798, 213-16 (1983) (resisting the mistaken view that criminal guilt is a matter of historical truth
devoid of moral evaluation).
99 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970).
100 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
101Id. The lines of demarcation between the two tests are not so clear as the text may
suggest. Four years after taking the position that habeas should be available only to an individual petitioner who makes a "colorable claim of innocence," Judge Friendly indicated support for the view that whole classes of claims insufficiently related to factual guilt should be
eliminated from the scope of the writ. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59
Cornell L. Rev. 634, 636-37 (1974). Justice Powell's position expressed both in Schneckloth
and, perhaps, his opinion for the Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), rests not only
on the importance of factual guilt, but also on the assumed virtues of the process model. See
notes 248-62 and accompanying text infra; see also Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger
Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev.
436, 456-59 (1980) (demonstrating that the opinion in Stone "attempted to respond with one
stroke to two fundamentally inconsistent arguments often marshalled in criticism of the Warren Court's expansion of habeas jurisdiction"-neglect of factual guilt and the process model).
I have treated Stone elsewhere. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 623-28 (1983) (concluding that Stone is not in the mainstream of
habeas at all but constitutes only another limitation on the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule); see Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 Ohio St. L.J.
367, 388-90 (1983).
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trial, notwithstanding interim changes beneficial to the applicant. 10 2 A
bill proposed by the Nixon Administration would have permitted the
federal habeas courts to treat federal issues only if new decisions regarding them would be applied retroactively-as determined by independent
retroactivity analysis. 103
C. The Process Model
The most persistent proposal for revising habeas partakes of the process model. 1°4 This is Professor Bator's approach, 0 5 and more recently
it has been embraced by the Reagan Administration.10 6 Bator argues
102 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-89 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 268 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See generally Note, United States v. Johnson: Reformulating the Retroactivity Doctrine, 69
Cornell L. Rev. 166, 178-83 (1983) (recalling Harlan's argument). Cf. Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 246-48 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (urging adoption of Harlan's
view).
103 See 119 Cong. Rec. 2224 (Jan. 26, 1973) (letter from Richard Kleindienst, Attorney
General, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, June 21, 1972)
(introduced in support of S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) (explaining that the bill would
limit habeas to claims having as their primary purpose the protection of either fact finding or
appellate process and that the test would parallel the standards used by the Court to determine
the retrospective effect of constitutional decisions).
104 Process-oriented jurisprudence is the linchpin of a liberal tradition that defines a lawful
result as the product of reasoned resolution by an institution competent to make such a deci-

sion. An articulation of the model can be found in the teaching materials prepared by Professors Hart and Sacks:
The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision. The principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly
established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole
society unless and until they are duly changed.
H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 4 (tent. ed. 1958). The fundamental notion that law
should be concerned with the adequacy of process rather than its substantive results is also
reflected in popular explanations of both public and private law adjudication. See, e.g., J. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust (1980) (justifying rigorous judicial review when there is a breakdown
in the democratic character of legislative action); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221 (1973) (drawing
parallels to private law adjudication). The roots of the process model are found in the Austinian understanding that law is only the coercive command of the sovereign. On that view,
the only questions that can be asked concerning a rule (or decision) are whether the sovereign
(or decisionmaking body) is "duly constituted" and whether "proper procedures were followed" in producing the result. R. Hutchins, Two Faces of Federalism 18 (1961). Thus the
process model assimilates both the "jurisdiction" and "adequate process" components of Professor Bator's analysis.
105 See Bator, supra note 78. See generally Peller, supra note 84, at 610-63, 669-90 (examining Professor Bator's thesis and the process model generally).
106 See The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-34 (1982) (section-by-section analysis by the U.S. Dep't
of Justice). Essentially the same program continues to be introduced in Congress. See, e.g., S.
238, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Reform of Federal Intervention in State Proceedings Act of 1983, S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). But see
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that because the search for objective accuracy is futile in any event, there
is generally no reason to prefer the judgments of federal district courts
sitting in habeas to those of the state courts whose previous decisions are
called into question. 107 Bator thus argues that the federal courts should
entertain habeas petitions only if the state courts have failed to provide
an adequate opportunity for the treatment of federal claims in the state
forum. The federal habeas courts ought not presume to second-guess
substantive decisions made by the state courts, even as to federal issues,
unless there is reason to doubt the process by which those decisions were
reached. 108
Bator acknowledges that the fourteenth amendment has substantive
content, that the state courts may reach incorrect decisions regarding
federal claims after the most searching and fair-minded process, and that
erroneous state decisions on federal constitutional issues may be upset by
the Supreme Court on direct review. 109 If, however, federal claims are
raised collaterally in habeas, he insists that the meaning of "due process"
changes. In the habeas context, Bator argues, the states provide the process that is "due" if they accord criminal defendants a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate federal claims at some point in their procedures. 110
note 257 infra (noting the current bill's limited departure from the process model). I have
treated the Administration's proposals elsewhere. See Yackle, supra note 101.
107 Bator, supra note 78, at 446-49.
109 Id. at 455-60. As precedent for his position, Bator relies primarily on Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), which he interprets to hold that:
[T]he fact that an unbiased court of competent jurisdiction has previously adjudicated, through a full and fair litigation, the merits of whether a defendant's federal rights
were violated is crucially relevant to the question whether his detention may on habeas
corpus be considered unlawful because he was denied due process of law.
Bator, supra note 78, at 487.
109 Bator, supra note 78, at 453-54.
110 Id. at 456-57. Bator would permit federal habeas review if the procedure employed in
state court was so flawed that it should not "'count' as a full and fair litigation." He would
have a federal habeas court ask "whether the conditions and tools of inquiry were such as to
assure a reasonedprobability that the facts were correctlyfound and the law correctly applied."
Id. at 455.
Bator does not argue that there are no identifiable federal issues apart from the process a
state provides to adjudicate claims of federal error. He acknowledges that there are such
claims and that they can be isolated from state corrective process. It is just that if state process
meets due process standards, such errors can be corrected only by the Supreme Court. He
explains using hypotheticals:
[T]he prisoner may claim that a confession offered by the prosecution was coerced,
or the jury discriminatorily selected. ... Nothing in the nature of these issues prevents the state trial court from constituting an unbiased and rational tribunal with respect to their decision, so that, in the absence of an allegation of some other procedural
flaw or absence of state remedy which prevented the fair and rational litigation of these
issues, we do not have here a failure of process. If, then, arguendo, federal collateral
inquiry is to be restricted to the category of cases exhibiting a failure of state process, an
allegation on habeas that the state violated the defendant's federal constitutional rights
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Bator concedes that his analysis can be "tricky." 1I He argues in essence
that due process means one thing in the Supreme Court, but quite another to a federal habeas court asked to examine a federal claim that was
not determined on appeal. The Supreme Court on direct review is free to
disregard any state process that might have been instituted to cure federal error and to reverse a criminal conviction if such error occurred at
any stage of the state proceedings. 1 12 A habeas court, by contrast, must
take account of any state corrective process that followed the asserted
federal error. If that process was itself "full and fair," the prisoner cannot be held to be in confinement in violation of federal law-even if, were
the habeas court to treat the merits of the underlying claim, it would
11 3
reach a different result.
The notion that the meaning of the Constitution shifts with the procedural posture in which a claimed violation is examined is, indeed,
"tricky." Yet Bator is obliged to link his proffered test for the availability of federal habeas to the scope of the constitutional claims open to
state criminal defendants. The controlling statute, section 2241, grants
federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases alleging "custody" in violation of
the "constitution or laws" of the United States.' 14 Bator recognizes as
would always lead initially to this inquiry: viewing the state processes in totality, did the
state at any time provide meaningful process for the testing of the question whether
there was such a violation? If the underlying substantive issue was litigated at trial and
does not bear on the integrity of the trial court's decision of the issue itself (e.g., admissibility of a confession or jury discrimination), habeas would not lie. If the issue was not
fairly litigated at trial, either because the question was simply unavailable at the time
(e.g., a later discovery of prosecution perjury, or a coerced guilty plea) or because the
issue is of a type invalidating the trial court's own decision of it (e.g., mob domination,
or bribery of the judge), but the state provided a concededly unflawed tribunal to test it
on appeal or collateral attack, habeas again would not lie. But if the state provides no
process at all (as where there is no state postconviction remedy to test the question
whether there was prosecution perjury), or provides only meaningless process (as where
the allegation of mob domination is not canvassed by any state tribunal concededly free
of such domination), habeas would be available.
Id. at 457 n.28.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 454.

113 Id. at 455-57. This, according to Bator, was what Justice Pitney envisioned in Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915):
The important point to remember about Frank is its insight that there comes a
point at which previous determinations, themselves fairly arrived at, settle the question
whether due process was in fact afforded, and that in our legal system that point is
usually where a judgment has become final and immune from direct review. There is, in
other words, nothing radical about the notion that a judgment has accorded due process
even though there remains a theoretical possibility-which possibility, it is the whole
thrust of the doctrine, will not be explored-that error has occurred as to a due process
question.
Id. at 486 n.119.
114 See note 17 supra.
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much and, in order to reconcile his model with prevailing statutory law,
explicitly blurs the kind of flawed process that he thinks should open the
door to habeas with a failure to adjudicate a prisoner's claim consistent
with due process. That heroic step having been taken, Bator next complicates matters still further by accepting relitigation in habeas if the state
court that entered the judgment under attack lacked jurisdiction.1 15 In
this regard, he relies on traditional rhetoric to the effect that decisions
rendered in the absence of jurisdiction are void and thus subject to collateral attack-particularly in habeas.1 1 6 In truth, however, he is here
again forced to argue as he does-this time because the process model on
which his theory rests proceeds on the premise that the decision-making
institution whose judgment is challenged was competent to decide the
matter at hand. Bator rejects, of course, the Supreme Court's reformulation of the notion of jurisdiction as freedom from federal error. 17 Indeed, he would defer to a state court's determination of its own
jurisdiction, unless there is reason to doubt the adequacy of the process
that produced the jurisdictional judgment or jurisdiction was patently
absent.' 18 In this, he folds his "adequate process" concerns into the
question of "competence."
If Bator's thesis appears strained, it is because the task he sets for
himself is daunting. His project is to reject, at the threshold, the deeply
rooted judgment that state criminal defendants are entitled at some point
to litigate their federal claims in federal court (the proposition plainly
implicated by the very existence of federal habeas corpus), to embrace
the process model (itself a manifestation of the view that federal and state
courts are fungible), and then to jam this analysis into the existing framework-shaving corners where necessary to achieve a rough fit. The fit, I
am afraid, is too rough. The trouble with Bator's model is that it proceeds from the wrong premise which, in turn, generates the wrong question. Bator assumes that the purpose of habeas is to arrive at correct
determinations of the issues that arise in state criminal prosecutions and
115 Bator, supra note 78, at 460-62.
116 Id. at 460-61 (citing Restatement of Judgments § 7 (1942); see Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830)). Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963) (resting in part on the
same tradition that void judgments may be collaterally impeached).
117 See Bator, supra note 78, at 513-14. But see Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05
(1942) (per curiam) (stating that the writ is not restricted to instances where the trial court
lacked jurisdiction and holding that federal habeas courts can reexamine federal issues whether
or not they involve the previous court's power to adjudicate); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
468 (1938) (maintaining the fiction that a court acts beyond its jurisdiction when it commits
constitutional error).
Is Bator, supra note 78, at 461-62. There is some support for such a position. See, e.g.,
Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 705-10 (1982) (stating that because the jurisdictional issue was fully and
fairly litigated previously, full faith and credit must be given to the prior court's judgment).
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asks whether the existing framework is well-suited to that task. Concluding that it is not, he proposes to discard habeas except in those instances
in which there is special reason to doubt the accuracy of prior state court
judgments. Yet if accuracy regarding points of law were the sole purpose
of habeas, we would hardly have the system we do. For one thing, we
would want a mechanism for correcting not only errors of federal law,
but errors of state law as well. That would evoke, one should think, an
insistence upon adequate state process for the correction of errors made
in earlier state proceedings. For another, we might be satisfied with direct, rather than collateral, review. Accuracy in the determination of
legal questions is routinely achieved on appeal, and if, indeed, accuracy
were our goal, we might demand, again, only an effective state appellate
process. In such a system, it would perhaps make sense to limit federal
habeas to the reserve role that Bator suggests. The regime actually in
place is, however, much different. Federal habeas corpus is concerned
only with state court errors touching federal claims and contemplates
thorough relitigation of both legal and factual issues. The existing shape
of habeas implies objectives well apart from ensuring accurate state court
judgments generally.
Bator concedes that the alternative thesis I want to defend is, indeed, defensible. "[T]here is no a priori reason why we should not decide
that the most acceptable arrangement for the decision of such questions
is that all such state-court determinations should be reviewed by a federal
district court on collateral attack."' 1 9 His concern is merely that such an
arrangement can be defended only on the basis of "functional, institutional and political considerations." 120 For Bator, the question is coldly
utilitarian. "If one set of institutions is as capable of performing the task
at hand as another, we should not ask both to do it." 121
None of the suggestions for curtailing the availability of habeas has
been adopted. The Supreme Court disclaimed Bator's analysis twenty
years ago, only months after he put it forward. 122 It enjoys a curious
staying power, perhaps because language suggesting the process model
occasionally appears in Supreme Court opinions. 123 On examination,
however, the few cases on point hardly attach to such language the thoroughgoing significance that Bator's thesis would demand. This is not to
suggest contentment with postconviction habeas. I have conceded much
discontent.124 The source of concern, however, is fairly traceable to the
119 Bator, supra note 78, at 449.

120 Id.
121 Id. at 451.

122 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
123 See text accompanying notes 195-281 infra.
124 See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
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failure of the conventional wisdom to explain federal habeas in a plausible manner. That is the task to which I now turn.
III
AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

A more satisfying explanation for collateral review in habeas
emerges if the "custody" doctrine is set aside and habeas is appraised for
its value within the general framework of federal jurisdiction. Relitiga-

tion in habeas ensures the availability of a trial-level federal forum to
litigants whose federal claims arise initially as defenses to state criminal
prosecutions. Although criminal defendants can be denied an opportunity to remove their cases to federal court for trial, they must be allowed
to present their federal claims in federal court after state proceedings
against them have been concluded. Postconviction habeas is not, on this
analysis, an especially advantageous, and ostensibly anomalous, form of
dispensation to state criminal defendants. Habeas is the trade-off for refusing litigants who enter the state courts as criminal defendants access
to federal court in the first instance.
A fair elaboration of this alternative explanation for habeas requires
discussion in three steps. First, I will treat the concededly controversial
view that all litigants with federal claims have or should have a "right"

to litigate those claims in a federal forum other than the Supreme Court.
Although acceptance of such a thoroughgoing proposition is not essential
to my thesis, the arguments for a general right to be in federal court are
powerful and worth recounting to place what is critical to my thesis in
perspective. In this regard, I will take up not only the lower federal
courts' original jurisdiction, but the existing law of removal-which
plainly frustrates the availability of the federal forum to some federal
claims. Routine removal on the basis of a federal defense is not now
available; I will contend that it should be. Second, I will address the less
ambitious claim that state criminal defendants who have federal issues to
raise in defense are or should be entitled to litigate those contentions in
federal court. Finally, I will explain why such criminal defendants
should not be allowed access to the federal forum originally, but should
be asked to postpone federal litigation until after state proceedings are
completed. At that point, they may then pursue federal relief in habeas
corpus. In this, of course, I will distinguish the removal that should be
denied-removal of criminal proceedings begun in state court-from removal that should be freely allowed.
A.

The Right to Litigate Federal Claims in Federal Court

The notion that litigants have a "right" to be in federal court grinds
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against the working assumption in the cases that litigants with federal
claims are not invariably permitted to choose a federal forum. 125
Although plaintiffs with federal claims may elect a federal forum under
section 1331,126 section 1441127 permits a defendant to remove only if the
plaintiff might have sued in federal court in the first instance.1 28 When a
federal issue appears in a case only by way of defense, the Mottley 129 rule
bars original federal jurisdiction and, accordingly, prevents removal at
the behest of the defendant.13 0 Gaps in current jurisdictional law do not,
125 For expressions of the working assumption, see, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 606 n.18 (1975) (commenting that "we in no way intend to suggest that there is a right of
access to a federal forum for the disposition of all federal issues"); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.
372, 382-83 (1977) (stating that the Constitution does not demand that constitutional claims be
considered by life-tenured, article III judges). Although in Swain the Court relied on its earlier
decisions approving the assignment of federal issues to article I, legislative courts, see, e.g.,
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), the Justices recently have shown less willingness to permit Congress to bypass the framework envisioned by article III. See Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion) (finding a broad grant of jurisdiction to non-article III bankruptcy judges unconstitutional). Even
in Northern Pipeline,however, the Court did not deny that state courts can be asked to determine federal issues, whether or not the judges enjoy salary and tenure safeguards. Id. at 64
n.15.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). Civil rights removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982) is, by
common consent, a virtual dead letter. The key cases are City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966), and Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966). See also Johnson v. Mississippi,
421 U.S. 213 (1975) (denying removal in light of Peacock and Rachel); Comment, Civil Rights
Removal After Rachel and Peacock: A Limited Federal Remedy, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 351
(1972). Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 90 (arguing for a more liberal reading of the statute).
Professor Redish has proposed a different construction of § 1443, which would permit removal
"when state [court] procedures are so defective or the applicable state precedents [are] so in
conflict with federal law that the defendant will be unable adequately to vindicate his applicable federal substantive rights in the state judicial system." M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction:
Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 324 (1980). That "process" model approach
would be consistent with the Court's response to similar, federal-state problems. See text accompanying notes 196-218 infra. My proposal, however, argues against such an approach.
128 Removal can come only at the insistence of a defendant resting upon the plaintiff's
action-not a plaintiff responding to a federal counterclaim. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
129 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
130 Existing law determines district court jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 (claims arising
under federal law) according to the court-fashioned rule that the federal claim must appear on
the face of the plaintiff's "well-pleaded" complaint. See Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74
(1914); Mottley, 211 U.S. 149. The American Law Institute's summary identifies three, related
propositions encompassed by the rule-that jurisdiction cannot be established by a federal
defense raised in the defendant's answer, that the plaintiff cannot anticipate such a federal
defense in constructing the complaint, and that jurisdiction cannot be manufactured through
the use of "nice" pleading rules. American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts 169-70 (1969) [hereinafter ALI Study]. The result, obviously enough, is that federal issues that do not appear on the face of the complaint but arise
later are boxed out of the federal, trial-level forum and can hope for federal review only by the
Supreme Court on direct review.
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however, mute the powerful, normative case for the routine availability
of the federal forum.
Ours is a system in which two parallel sets of courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction in most cases arising under federal law.131 No internally
consistent arrangement can operate to perfection in such a system. The
best we can do is to draw an admittedly value-laden line defining spheres
of primary responsibility. It is light work to defend the general proposition that litigants with federal claims should be entitled to litigate in federal court and to rebut the contending view that state and federal courts
are fungible for purposes of federal adjudication. This ground has been
covered, and covered well, in familiar literature.132 Indeed, a general
right to litigate in a federal court, other than the Supreme Court, is already widely accepted in practice. In some instances, the desirability of
federal adjudication is sufficiently plain that Congress has taken the
choice of forum away from the litigants concerned by establishing exclusive jurisdiction in federal court. 133 In addition, there are cases in which
it is doubtful that state courts can issue relief,134 and others in which
there are well-recognized historical claims in support of federal
35
adjudication.
Elsewhere, to be sure, the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts is
generally accepted. Yet the recognition that state courts have power to
determine federal issues hardly suggests that litigants with federal claims
have no genuine interest in the choice of forum and thus can be diverted
to state court at no cost. Nor should it be presumed that the state courts
are society's primary dispute resolution institutions, irrespective of the
nature of the claims in issue.13 6 There are sound reasons for giving effect
131See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
286 (1970).
132 See text accompanying notes 139-47 infra.
133 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982) (patent and
copyright); 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1982) (federal crimes).
134 Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 429 (reporting that the Supreme Court has never
decided whether state courts can enjoin federal officers). See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
397 (1871) (concluding that a state court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus
purporting to require the release of a prisoner held by federal military authorities); Redish &
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 93 (1975) (reading Tarble's Case to mean
that the state courts lack power to "control directly the acts of federal officers").
135 See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-72 (1959)
(recalling that the need for federal adjudication of admiralty cases was one of the chief reasons
originally given for establishing a system of lower federal courts).
136 That is, those who would have the federal courts available for the adjudication of federal
claims should not be required to bear the burden of proof. But see Bator, The State Courts
and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 637 (1981) (insisting that
state courts should continue to play a substantial role in determining federal constitutional
issues); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
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to litigants' choice of the federal forum. 137 Summarizing the literature in
point, litigants have an interest in obtaining a sympathetic forum in
which their federal claims will be addressed by independent judges familiar with relevant principles. In addition, there is a national interest in the
138
correct and uniform interpretation of federal law.
I do not propose to enter the debate regarding the comparative abilities and institutional competence of federal and state judges. One need
not take the view that state judges are less sympathetic adjudicators of
federal issues in order to propose that the system should indulge federal
litigants' suspicions in that vein. In any case, others have given the argument for preferring federal judges. 139 Still others find federal judges to be
in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1363-64, 1401 (1953) (viewing state courts as our primary
dispute-resolution mechanisms).
137 No one seriously proposes that direct review in the Supreme Court can or should provide litigants with an adequate federal forum for litigation. The Court is not a court of error.
While it depends upon cases as vehicles for judicial action and, indeed, has no power to act in
the absence of an Article III case or controversy, the effect of its decisions upon the litigants at
bar is only one factor in its decision to hear a case. The national significance of the issue
presented is another, far weightier element in the same decision. P. Freund, The Supreme
Court of the United States 16 (1961). Accord Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 12 n.6 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, J.J.); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 368 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and White, J.); Vinson,
Address of the Chief Justice before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, quoted in R.
Stem & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 258 (5th ed. 1978). As a practical matter, the
Court is incapable of hearing all claims brought before it. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-18 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of writ of
certiorari) (surveying the many reasons the Justices may have for declining review in a particular instance). Of course, these same problems have generated several plans for reducing the
Justices' workload. See, e.g., Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A.
J. 442 (1983); Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the
Supreme Court, reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972); Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change,
67 F.R.D. 195 (1975); Coleman, The Supreme Court of the United States: Managing its
Caseload to Achieve its Constitutional Purposes, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1983); Note, Of High
Designs: A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1983). I mean to express no views regarding such proposals. For examples
of two positions, compare Freund, A National Court of Appeals, 25 Hastings L.J. 1301 (1974)
(recognizing the need for a National Court of Appeals due to caseload pressures) with Black,
The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 Yale L.J. 883 (1974) (arguing on
both constitutional and policy grounds that a National Court of Appeals is unwise); Brennan,
The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 473, 474 (1973) (insisting that a National Court of Appeals is "unnecessary and ill-advised"); Estreicher & Sexton, A
Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 681 (1984) (arguing that the adoption of systematic criteria for granting certiorari
would substantially reduce the Court's workload).
138 See Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction,
83 Yale L.J. 498, 510-13 (1974) (discussing the increasingly important role of the lower federal
courts in maintaining uniformity).
139 This issue has been accompanied by considerable debate. Compare Utah Symposium,
supra note 80, at 33 (remarks of Professor Walter Gellhorn) (doubting the sensitivity of state
judges) with id. at 43 (remarks of Judge Charles Desmond) (refusing to accept that position).
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more independent' 4° than their state counterparts and thus more appropriate enforcers of unpopular federal rights. 141 The American Law Institute finds ample support, even in recent decisions, for the view that
federal judges are more sensitive to federal claims and bring greater familiarity and expertise to the treatment of those claims. 142 Conversely,
43
state courts specialize in local, rather than federal, law issues.'
Although state judges might gain expertise in treating federal claims if
permitted to decide more cases in which federal issues are at stake, they
have the opportunity to adjudicate federal issues whenever litigants entitled to be in federal court choose nevertheless to litigate in the state fo-

rum. Even then, the determination of federal issues will always be
secondary to courts charged primarily with the enforcement of state
law.144 Nor would these interests be adequately protected in a regime in
which the lower federal courts exercised only appellate jurisdiction in
federal question cases originally litigated in state court. 145 Appellate review does not substitute for the trial-level resolution of factual disputes.
Accurate determination of relevant facts has particular importance in

constitutional adjudication, 146 and "Judges of the Third Article" have
Compare also Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 Viii. L. Rev. 893, 1070
(1982) (remarks of Professor Paul Bator) (insisting that there is no evidence that state judges
are insensitive to federal issues) [hereinafter Villanova Symposium] with id. at 1071 (remarks
of Professor Martin Redish) (taking the opposing view); Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of State Court Convictions, 50 Geo. L.J. 755, 755 (1962) (reporting the state courts'
hostility to federal habeas corpus). See generally Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation
in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 213 (1983); Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 165 (1984).
140 Professor Sager focuses his argument upon the tenure and salary protections guaranteed
to federal judges but often not enjoyed by state judges. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 61-68 (1981). Professor Redish holds
different views on some points, but also doubts the independence of state judges (as compared
to federal district judges) in the enforcement of fourteenth amendment claims. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to
Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143, 161-66 (1982).
141E.g., Neuborne, supra note 22; Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference
in Search of a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 488 (1978). See also R. Posner, The Federal
Courts 171-72, 175 (1985); McCormack, supra note 70, at 262-64.
142 ALI Study, supra note 130, at 165-67 (cited in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 514
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
143 The rhetoric urging the elimination of the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction places
emphasis on this perception. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1979, 65 A.B.A.
J. 358, 362 (1979).
144 M. Redish, supra note 127, at 2 & n.8. See also Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 945, 948 (1964): "My state court responsibility, while it included jurisdiction over federal questions and federal-state conflicts, was inevitably colored by the fact that I
was, after all, a state judge."
145 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
146 See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) (stating that "[i]t is the typical, not
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traditionally distinguished themselves in their sensitive treatment of
factfinding. 147 Appellate review also is unable to accommodate issues
based on allegations outside the state court record. Claims of that kind
frequently arise in constitutional challenges to state criminal processes.
There are, of course, many who disagree with these and similar arguments favoring the availability of a federal forum for federal issues. 48
The Court itself, in recent opinions, appears to have assumed the essential fungibility of state and federal judges.' 49 Until very recently, however, the Court entertained little doubt that litigants had a "right" to
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts-a "right" that was "theirs
by reason of congressional enactments passed pursuant to congressional
policy." 150 By writing jurisdictional legislation, "Congress imposed the
duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a
suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims."' 51 The mere existence of jurisdiction established a choice of forums, and "[t]he right of a party plaintiff to choose a
Federal court where there [was] a choice [could not] be properly
152
denied."
The Constitution, of its own force, does not necessarily establish a
right to litigate in a federal forum. The language of article III and the
the rare, case in which constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested factual
issues"); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935). The Justices have often remarked
that they hesitate to examine the validity of a state statute "on its face" and prefer to evaluate
the constitutionality of its application in factual context. E.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 611-15 (1973) (explaining that the Court's "overbreadth" analysis is limited to free
speech cases). Similar concerns underlie the Court's "ripeness" decisions. See, e.g., United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947).
147 The phrase belonged to the late Professor Bernard J. Ward. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 614 & n.8 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982). See also Wright, The Wit and Wisdom of Bernie Ward, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 13, 19 (1982).
148 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 136; O'Connor, supra note 14, at 812-14.
149 E.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981) (insisting that there is no reason to
doubt that state judges are doing "their mortal best to discharge their oath of office"); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (refusing to credit any "general distrust of the capacity of
the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493 n.35 (1976) (declining to assume that "there now exists a general lack of appropriate
sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States"). Similar sentiments appear in the Younger v. Harrisline of cases. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Harlan filed a dissent objecting to the majority's "unarticulated assumption that state courts will not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate constitutional
rights promptly and effectively." Id. at 499. The Younger cases decided in the wake of Dombrowski assume that state courts are competent to treat federal claims properly and to arrive at
accurate results. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975).
150 Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964) (holding that a state court cannot
enjoin parties from litigating an in personam action in a federal court that has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter).
151Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
152 Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909).
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absence of general federal question jurisdiction until 1875 makes such a
thesis virtually indefensible.153 Nor has Congress created such a right in
every federal question case as a matter of statutory law. Congress appears satisfied with the "well-pleaded complaint" rule,1 54 even as it has
been applied in declaratory judgment cases,1 55 and there is no sustainable
basis for arguing that the rule misinterprets the meaning of section
153 Article III does not create lower federal courts but apparently leaves their establishment
to Congress. See Redish & Woods, supra note 134 (appraising possible limitations upon congressional power). Even the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to "exceptions"
established by Congress. See Villanova Symposium, supra note 139 (surveying various interpretations of the "exceptions" clause). See also Gressman & Gressman, Necessary and Proper
Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 495 (1983); Merry, Scope
of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 53 (1962);
Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 157 (1960); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. Rev.
229 (1973). The conventional wisdom is that Congress has substantial power over the federal
courts' jurisdiction at every level. See, e.g., C. Black, Decision According to Law 37-39
(1981); Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (1984). For the first century of the nation's history, the lower federal courts existed but exercised no general jurisdiction of cases
"arising under" federal law. That authority was not granted until the 1875 Judiciary Act. Act
of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. Part 3, 470. In view of the tardy appearance of federal question
jurisdiction, it is exceedingly difficult to contend that the Constitution itself entitles litigants to
choose a federal forum. To take that position, one must argue either that Congress unconstitutionally denied access to the lower federal courts for a hundred years or that circumstances
have changed so radically that earlier understandings of article III must be completely reformulated. See, e.g., Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984) (developing
the thesis that Congress's power is limited to allocating the judicial power established by article III within the federal court system).
154 The Court has, even recently, made it implicitly clear that the "well-pleaded complaint"
rule is not constitutionally mandated and that article III allows federal adjudication in any
case "that might call for the application of federal law." E.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) (relying on Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)). Yet Congress has not attempted to expand jurisdiction under § 1331
beyond the boundaries marked by the Court's "well-pleaded complaint" rule. See also
Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 395,
410-14 (1976) (identifying the rule as an illustration of the system's failure to take account of
the relaxation in federal pleading standards).
155 The leading case is Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), in
which Justice Frankfurter held for the Court that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1977), is "'procedural only.'" Id. at 671 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)). That is, the Act does not add to the jurisdiction enjoyed by the
federal district courts prior to its enactment. Jurisdiction exists in a federal declaratory judgment action only if it would have existed in a coercive action in the absence of the Act. If in
such an action the federal issue would have emerged only as a defense, there is no § 1331
jurisdiction even though the plaintiff requests a declaration regarding the merits of such an
issue. Id. at 672. Aware of the Skelly Oil interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act and
its relationship to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, Congress has made no move to change
the law. The American Law Institute, by contrast, would. See ALI Study, supra note 130, at
170-71.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:991

1331.156 Both the Constitution and congressional enactments, however,
establish the predicates for a general right to litigate federal claims in
federal court. The Constitution contemplates a role for the lower federal
courts, particularly with respect to issues of federal law. 157 And Congress has gone far toward opening the federal courthouse to most wouldbe litigants with federal claims. 158 The elimination of the amount-in-controversy requirement from section 1331 is only the most recent

illustration.

59

156 It is too late to do so. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983) (referring to the rule as a "powerful doctrine" that resolves most
jurisdictional questions and avoids "more-or-less automatically" many "potentially serious
federal-state conflicts"). The ALI can find no better way of reading § 1331. See ALI Study,
supra note 130, at 176.
157 See M. Redish, supra note 127, at 1 (advocating a presumption that individuals with
federal claims are entitled to vindicate those claims in a federal forum). Although Justice
Frankfurter believed that "[s]ome federal rights are readily adapted to enforcement by state
tribunals," he recognized that "[n]ational sentiment also regards federal tribunals as the appropriate guardians of federal rights" and concluded that "[w]e may take it for granted. . that
our distinctively federal law will in the main be enforced through the federal courts." Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell LQ.
499, 515 (1928).
158 With the exception of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, federal question jurisdiction
under § 1331 is "very nearly as broad as the constitutional grant." C. Wright, supra note 1, at
6. Some modem critics of federal jurisdiction argue that Congress has opened the federal
courts' doors too broadly and that the district courts' present jurisdiction should be curtailed.
See, e.g., H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 197-99 (1973); Hill & Baker,
Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 Emory L.J. 3, 76-87 (1983). See also Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the
Federal Caseload, 1973 Law & Contemp. Soc. 557.
159 Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). The elimination of the arbitrary, monetary
barrier to federal jurisdiction reflects a congressional desire for access to the federal forum to
turn on a substantive judgment regarding the propriety of federal, rather than state, adjudication. "Gate-keeping" proposals to reduce federal jurisdiction out of concern over swelled
caseloads, see, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 157, at 515-16; Goldberg, supra note 154, at 45658, should also be rejected. There is no reason to believe that the quality of justice in the
federal courts can be maintained only by restricting the sheer number of cases on the docket. I
am aware of no data supporting the assertion that an increased number of federal judgeships
would diminish the prestige of such positions, that heavy workloads will discourage able men
and women from accepting appointments, or that there is an imminent threat of exhausting the
supply of competent candidates for the federal bench. To insist that the "problem" in this field
lies in overburdened federal dockets and that the "answer" is to channel more litigation to the
state courts is to neglect not only the physical impact upon local tribunals, but the institutional
responsibility to allocate judicial business on a principled basis. If the quality of federal justice
would benefit from the elimination of an entire class of litigation, a more likely candidate is
diversity jurisdiction. Accord H. Friendly, supra note 158, at 139-52; Redish, supra note 140,
at 166 n.14. See also McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction: Legislative and Judicial Change, 28
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 517, 554 (1978) (advocating the elimination of diversity jurisdiction but
urging that any effort to diminish federal court authority to consider federal questions should
"proceed with caution"); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and
Potential for Further Reforms, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1979) (noting that the abolition of diversity jurisdiction would allow rationalization and reform of many aspects of federal practice and
procedure).
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The reordering of the relations between the states and the national
government in the wake of the Civil War brought with it the most
profound implications for the federal judiciary. 160 The postwar amend-

ments (particularly the fourteenth) and the flurry of legislative enactments (among them the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867)161 established the
federal courts' special role in the protection of individual liberty against
state power. 162 The primacy of those courts in the determination of federal law was recognized early in this century, albeit for the purpose of
limiting state attempts to regulate economic affairs. 1 63 Later, the Warren
160 The classic treatise explains that when Congress established general, federal question
jurisdiction in 1875, the lower federal courts "ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing
between citizens of different states and became the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." F.
Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 65 (1927); see also S. Kutler,
Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics 143-60 (1968) (finding expansion of federal court
power in removal jurisdiction); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651 (1979). But see Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39.
161 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
162 Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute
Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1985); Developments in the LawSection 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1147-56 (1977) [hereinafter Section 1983
Developments]; see also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503-07 (1982); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65 (1974). The Court's most vigorous dissertation on the subject came in Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972), in which the specific question in issue was whether civil rights actions pursuant to
§ 1983 are subject to the anti-injunction statute, § 2283:
The predecessor of § 1983 was. . . an important part of the basic alteration in our
federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment. As a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the postCivil War era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was its centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against
Section 1983 opened the federal courts to
state power was clearly established ....
private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed
authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation

This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was
altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection
of federally created rights; it was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect
those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication
of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts ....
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of
federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the anti-injunction statute
was enacted. The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, "whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial."
Id. at 238-39, 242 (citations and footnotes omitted).
163 It was clear, of course, that if individuals were to be able to enforce the fourteenth
amendment affirmatively, it was necessary to address the apparent barrier presented by the
eleventh amendment. The analysis in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), provided the
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Court surely assumed the desirability of ensuring litigants a choice of the

federal forum for the adjudication of federal questions. 164 The recognition of such a choice now would be wholly consistent with the history of
165
the past hundred years.
It seems plain enough, then, that existing statutes and modem
precedents can be reconciled with a general right to be in federal court
and, accordingly, that little tinkering with existing arrangements would
be required to make it law. Current statutes run counter in only one
important respect: removal. Indeed, one may fairly insist that the denial
answer: because no state has power either to enact an unconstitutional statute or to authorize
one of its agents to enforce an unconstitutional policy, in any case in which state officers attempt to act in violation of the Constitution they act not for the state but as individualssubject to suit in federal court. See also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278, 292-93 (1913); Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case
Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423 (explaining that Young was an essential
ingredient of the campaign to involve the federal courts in the protection of economic interests
against state regulation).
164 The habeas cases, particularly Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Townsend v. Sam,
372 U.S. 293 (1963), are the obvious examples. See note 7 supra. In those cases, the Warren
Court embraced the root proposition, established earlier in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), that litigants in "custody" are entitled to at least one opportunity to litigate their federal claims in the federal forum. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 7, at 1465. In another
context, the Court accepted the various abstention doctrines under which the federal courts
decline to exercise jurisdictional power that is clearly theirs, but erected machinery to ensure
that abstention would not deprive a litigant of his "right to litigate his federal claims fully in
the federal courts." England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417
(1964). See also Board of Regents of the Univ. of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 496
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 If anyone doubts that a change has occurred only recently, I invite her to compare the
portions of Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972),
quoted earlier, see note 162 supra, with his opinion for the majority in Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980):
The actual basis of the Court of Appeals' holding appears to be a generally framed
principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered
opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture
in which the federal claim arises. But the authority for this principle is difficult to discern. It cannot lie in the Constitution, which makes no such guarantee, but leaves the
scope of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to the wisdom of Congress. And
no such authority is to be found in § 1983 itself. For reasons already discussed at length,
nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent
to deny binding effect to a state-court judgment or decision when the state court, acting
within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate
federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights.
Id. at 103-04 (footnote omitted). The two cases themselves are easily reconciled. The question
in Mitchum was whether a federal court had jurisdiction to adjudicate initially, while in Allen
the Court was faced with an attempt to relitigate a federal issue already determined in state
court. That distinction is important to me as well as the Court. Indeed, I want to focus on it
in order to explain when, in some instances, the federal forum should be available only after
the state courts have acted. See text accompanying notes 170-94 infra. The distinction is
important to the Court, however, in that it identifies cases in which, if federal adjudication is
not invoked initially, federal review later is foreclosed entirely.
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of removal on the basis of a federal defense deflates the contention that
the federal courts are now largely open for the litigation of federal issues.
As long as federal defenses are relegated to state court, despite the desires
of the parties and even when the defenses are dispositive, it is impossible
to maintain that there is any general right to the federal forum. The
critical point here, however, is that proposals to change current law and
to permit removal routinely on the basis of a dispositive federal defense
are long-standing and largely noncontroversial. The American Law Institute (ALI) proposed such a rule sixteen years ago, as part of its program for the general revision of the Judicial Code.1 66 The ALI
concluded that federal issues are entitled to federal adjudication, even if
they emerge after the plaintifts properly pleaded complaint is filed. At
least when federal issues can be identified before the state courts invest
substantial time and energy, 167 removal should be available to either
166 ALI Study, supra note 130, at 187-96.
167 See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 506 &
n.53 (1954) (noting the inconvenience of tardy removal). Some observers have encouraged the
use of "special jurisdictional allegations" to identify federal issues litigants expect to arise subsequent to the filing of a well-pleaded complaint. See ALI Study, supra note 130, at 190-91;
see also Chadboum & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev.
639, 665 (1942); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev.
157, 164 (1953). The purpose, of course, would be to avoid the rigidity of the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule and to establish an alternative mechanism for flagging federal issues early.
The ALI would retain the "well-pleaded complaint" rule but would achieve a similar
flexibility by permitting removal if a defendant raises a federal defense. The ALI would also
permit defendants to remove on the basis of a federal compulsory counterclaim and would
permit plaintiffs to remove on the basis of a permissive federal counterclaim, but would not
allow any party to remove on the basis of federal cross- or third-party claims. The ALI proposes an amount-in-controversy requirement for federal defense and similar removal cases.
Other limitations of lesser significance are also proposed. But see D. Currie, Federal Courts
185-86 (3d ed. 1982) (apparently finding the proposed limitations too restrictive).
The most important restriction on removal in the ALI proposal is the requirement that
the federal issue must be "dispositive" of the litigation. This demand for decision-making
significance restricts federal jurisdiction to cases well within the outer boundaries of article III,
which authorizes Congress to confer jurisdiction when a federal issue potentially forms an
"ingredient" of the action. See note 154 supra. Under the ALI proposal, some federal issues
that arise in state court litigation in circumstances in which removal is unavailable will enjoy
no access to a federal forum other than the Supreme Court. However, allowing a lower court
federal forum for every federal issue, no matter how remote it may be from the actual dispute,
might threaten the flexibility that cooperative federalism demands. Ordinary federal question
jurisdiction under § 1331 is limited to "substantial" federal issues, excluding questions that
have only an indirect or remote bearing on the matter at hand. See Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S.
332 (1906). See also ALI Study, supra note 130, at 177-78 (also adopting this rule). The
exclusion of remote issues will not undercut the general expectation of federal court availability on which my explanation of habeas corpus is based.
Similarly, I do not pause to appraise the federal courts' familiar hesitancy to adjudicate
federal issues arising in litigation touching subjects of extraordinary local interest, see, e.g.,
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (relying on abstention to avoid treatment of a
dispute involving oil and gas regulation), except to note that the Supreme Court has at times
ruled on federal questions in cases generally considered to be the province of the state courts.
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party.1 68 Thus defendants should be permitted to remove on the basis of
a federal defense and plaintiffs on the basis of a federal reply. In this
Compare Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859) (disclaiming diversity jurisdiction in
domestic relations cases) with Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (finding that a state statute
concerning the payment of alimony violated the equal protection clause). See generally Note,
The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1824 (1983).
168 "It is logically sound to permit removal to the party who opposes the federal right as
well as to the party who asserts the right." ALI Study, supra note 130, at 194. A rule reserving removal to the party raising a federal claim would neglect the substantial interest of all
concerned in the correct treatment of any federal issue. Cf. Villanova Symposium, supra note
139, at 1070-71 (1982) (remarks of Professor Bator) (pointing out that there are constitutional
values on both sides of litigation and that state officers have an interest in obtaining an accurate determination of the extent of valid state power).
Professor Wechsler would deny removal in federal defense cases--on the ground that
"[t]here is no need for the original jurisdiction when litigants rely on federal rights to furnish
them a shield but not a sword." Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 216, 234 (1948). The ALI disagrees and has, in my
judgment, the better argument.
Problems will arise. If, for example, the state itself is a defendant in state court litigation,
the eleventh amendment may bar removal by a private plaintiff should the state raise a federal
defense. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904) (indicating that a state may waive
sovereign immunity in suits in its own courts without relinquishing eleventh amendment immunity in similar actions in federal court); accord Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 n.19
(1974).
If a state officer initiates suit in state court and a private defendant raises a federal defense,
it may be unsettling to permit removal by either party. Inasmuch as the states have their own
means of obtaining judicial review of administrative or legislative actions, the federal courts
may hesitate to entertain suits to test the validity of state actions under federal law. See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1983). Where
the private defendant seeks removal, the federal courts may be reluctant, in the interest of
comity, to "snatch" away lawsuits that a state has initiated in its own courts. Id. at 21 n.22.
Problems such as these nourish the unsettlement in recent, noncriminal cases in the
Younger v. Harris line, in which early federal intervention threatens to frustrate state officers'
attempts to employ the state courts to enforce state policies despite the existence of a federal
defense. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); see also Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil
Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 27 (1976) (appraising earlier decisions). Although there is a close relationship between the circumstances in
which prejudgment federal intervention by injunction and removal to the federal forum are or
should be permitted, see text accompanying notes 196-218 infra, it is doubtful that the availability (or not) of removal at the instance of a state or state officer presents difficulties for my
explanation of postconviction habeas. It is unlikely that the availability of removal to the
states would generate many attempts to catapult state-initiated lawsuits into the federal forum.
See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at n.22. Even if there is a substantial number of such cases,
permitting states and state officers to invoke federal jurisdiction of federal issues would not
seriously interfere with existing federal-state relations. States already can be parties to federal
litigation by waiving or failing to raise nonjurisdictional barriers to federal adjudication. See,
e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977) (holding that a
state may voluntarily submit to federal litigation despite an ability to insist upon Younger
restraint); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 n.19 (1975) (noting that reliance on
preclusion rules can also be waived).
Removal should be allowed even when it frustrates state attempts to further policies in the
civil context. That, indeed, is the choice made when removal jurisdiction is established. If it is
granted that the federal courts should have general jurisdiction in federal question cases, there
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respect, present law is precisely the opposite of what it should be. 169
B.

The Federal Forum and State CriminalDefendants

The case for a general right to litigate federal claims in federal court
is impressive, although not entirely undisputed. The case for a more limited right of access on behalf of state criminal defendants is, by comparison, irresistible. The arguments here are, of course, the very
considerations that gave birth to federal habeas corpus for state prisoners
in the aftermath of the Civil War and that led to the writ's development
into a general postconviction remedy in this century. The federal claims
raised by criminal defendants in state court are typically grounded in the
fourteenth amendment, itself promulgated in part to establish procedural
safeguards in state criminal prosecutions. We have in this country a
long, cultural history that demonstrates the need for such safeguards.
The Supreme Court's use of the fourteenth amendment, of its own force
and as a vehicle for incorporating safeguards found in the Bill of Rights,
testifies to the demand for significant federal involvement in state criminal cases. That involvement extends beyond the declaration of federal
procedural standards to the enforcement of those standards in an independent, federal forum.
To be sure, this tradition of distrust is traceable to historical (and
modem) suspicions regarding the commitment of the state courts to the
federal procedural standards applicable to criminal cases. Yet the more
telling explanation lies in the institutional setting in which state courts
address fourteenth amendment claims. The primary focus in state court
is upon the implementation of state substantive criminal law policiesupon the determination of guilt in the individual case. Although all participants, and certainly state judges, also have the duty to respect defendants' federal constitutional rights, their chief duty is to enforce the law
with respect to individuals the police and prosecutors honestly believe to
have violated that law. The overriding responsibility of the state courts
is no reason to withhold such jurisdiction simply because a critical federal issue arises only by
way of defense. ALI Study, supra note 130, at 188-91.
169 The framework I propose would affect the state courts and their work very little. They
would remain authoritative with respect to questions of local law. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37, 41 (1984) (holding that a federal court may not issue the writ of habeas corpus on the basis
of an error of state law). In addition, when nondispositive federal issues appear as mere "ingredients" in lawsuits otherwise governed by state law, the state courts would retain decisionmaking authority-subject to appellate review by the Supreme Court. Finally, allowing defendants having dispositive federal contentions to remove to federal court would not deprive
the state courts of substantial business. It is not proposed that litigants be required to present
federal claims to a federal forum, and not all litigants entitled to remove will do so. The actual
incidence of removal under present law is very low, ALI Study, supra note 130, at 192, and
there is no reason to think that the federal courts would be flooded if the rules were changed.
But see H. Friendly, supra note 158, at 124-27.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:991

to carry out state law thus deprives them of the neutrality and dispassion
demanded for contemporaneous enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. It is because they are charged with other, potentially conflicting
duties that state courts' determinations of federal claims raised in defense
cannot be accepted as final.
Notwithstanding the compelling arguments for allowing state criminal defendants, if not all litigants with federal claims, some opportunity
to litigate in federal court, existing law provides that opportunity only in
postconviction habeas-after state court proceedings have come to an
end. My project here is to explain why this should continue to be the law
even if removal should become available on the basis of a federal defense
in ordinary, civil actions-why, that is, litigants with the most powerful
case for access to the federal forum should be forced to postpone federal
adjudication when others enjoy it immediately.170 While I appreciate the
conventional argument that the state courts have important interests in
their criminal proceedings, 17 1 I do not rest on that familiar ground. I
rely, instead, on the practical difficulties that removal in criminal cases
would present and, more important, on libertarian values that would be
threatened by early federal interference with state criminal prosecutions.
The routine removal of criminal cases based on federal defenses is
simply impractical. The federal claims available to criminal defendants
are typically procedural, their effect on outcome characteristically obscure. 172 There are exceptions, of course, as when defendants challenge
the validity of the statutes under which they are charged1 73 or contend
that the state trial itself would violate the Constitution.1 74 Then it may
be feasible to test the merit of claims before trial. Ordinarily, however,
defendants complain that evidence against them was obtained unlaw170 I do not contend that Congress lacks power to provide for the removal of criminal cases
involving federal issues. That issue has long been settled. See, e.g., City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262-71 (1880). I argue
only that action of that kind would be unwise.
171See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907 (1984).
172 For the most part, federal claims in this context are grounded in the fourteenth amendment, especially as it "incorporates" more specific safeguards established by the Bill of Rights.
See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929 (1965);
Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 249 (1968). Nonconstitutional federal issues also occasionally arise. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067
(4th Cir. 1971) (considering a claim that the state trial court had acted after a removal petition
had been filed and thus lacked jurisdiction); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: The Cognizability of Violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 975 (1983).
173 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (holding a state statute unconstitutionally vague).
174 See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978).
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fully 175 or that procedures at trial fail adequately to respect federally
guaranteed safeguards. 17 6 The merit of claims of that kind, and certainly
their effect upon the proceedings, can be ascertained only later, after the
state courts have responded to litigants' federal objections. Indeed, in the
typical case federal complaints can be identified and formulated only as
proceedings progress or, in some instances, when the prosecution has run
its course. To take an obvious example, only in retrospect can defendants argue that various errors at trial, appraised in cumulative effect,
resulted in fundamentally unfair proceedings in violation of the due pro1 77
cess clause.
Even if it were practical to permit criminal defendants to remove, it
would be inappropriate to do so. Routine removal of state criminal prosecutions to the federal forum for trial would be inconsistent with a commonly invoked but rarely understood structural element of the American
scheme-federalism. The very mention of the term will undoubtedly
produce knowing nods of approval from some observers and impatient
shakes of the head from others. Federalism is the Old Reliable of federal
jurisdiction, the shibboleth of those whose tendency is to seek not justifications for the exercise of federal judicial power, but excuses for divesting
the federal courts of cases or claims. I have nothing to do with that kind
of federalism. There are perfectly good and articulable reasons for our
constitutionally grounded distrust of concentrated power. Federalism
has deep and ancient roots in a political philosophy that insists that decentralized government promises the greatest protection for individual
liberty. The Constitution fosters centrifugal forces not because the diffusion of power has intrinsic value, but because the maintenance of freedom may well depend on it.
A large and familiar literature attests that decentralization serves
178
genuine, identifiable functions in the American governmental scheme.
175 See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that the state had violated the
fifth amendment in obtaining an inculpatory statement from the petitioner).
176 See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (striking down a jury instruction that
shifted the burden of proving a material element of a crime to the defendant).
177 See, e.g., Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (examining alleged constitutional infirmity in a prosecutor's summation); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
(instructing habeas courts to award relief if the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
178 See, e.g., W. Bennett, American Theories of Federalism (1964); S. Davis, The Federal
Principle (1978); Essays in Federalism (Institute for Studies in Federalism 1961); M. Grodzins,
The American System (D. Elazar ed. 1966); R. Leach, American Federalism 57-82 (1970); D.
Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary 499-515 (1963) (advocating decentralized government); M. Reagan & J. Sanzone, The New Federalism 3-30 (2d ed. 198 1); 1 A. Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 85-97 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ed. 1945); M. Vile, The Structure of
American Federalism 21-40 (1961); K. Wheare, Federal Government 40-52 (4th ed. 1964);
Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847,
853-57 (1979).
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First, decentralization accommodates diversity. Disparate groups, separated not only geographically but philosophically, may and often do wish
to fashion governmental policy according to their own predilections and

tastes. Different policy choices are the natural consequence of individualism and pluralism, which lie near the core of American presuppositions.179 Second, decentralization encourages self-determination.
Individuals can hope to participate meaningfully in politics only if the
unit of government they seek to influence is small enough to be affected
by, and to respond to, their attempts to be heard. The larger the population, the more difficult it becomes for individuals to have a hand in the
determination of policy. 180 Third, decentralization fosters efficiency. Local government can take account of peculiar and varied circumstances in
which policy must be applied and can be flexible, grooming rules to better serve actual needs. Larger governmental units must draw rough lines
and create broad categories in order to implement policies formulated at
a higher level of abstraction. Attempts to build flexibility into those poliexcessive bucies or their attendant enforcement machinery may lead to
18 1
inefficiencies.
own
its
by
turn
in
accompanied
reaucracy,

A fourth function of federalism, deeply grounded in the political
theory that informed the enterprise in Philadelphia, 182 establishes the ra179 Justice Brandeis captured a similar idea in his famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
180 See Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in Liberal Democracy 95 (J. Pennock
& J. Chapman ed. 1983).
181See M. Grodzins, supra note 178, at 383 (advocating the maintenance of strong state and
local authority in part because "other things being equal, judgments by neighbors are more apt
to be correct than those by strangers"); H. Kaufman, Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses
78-82 (1977) (taking note of complaints that a "profusion of authoritative organs" can produce
inconsistent and duplicative constraints and procedures, but concluding that concentrating
authority "does not banish red tape any more than devolving power does" and "[s]ometimes
.. . even adds to the problem").
182 It was Montesquieu's view that the republican form of government could exist only if
the population to be governed was small, yet he acknowledged that a large population might
retain the essentials of a republic by establishing a confederate structure:
If a republic be small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it be large, it is ruined by
an internal imperfection ...
It is, therefore, very probable that mankind would have been, at length, obliged to
live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of
constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a confederate republic.
This form of government is a convention by which several petty states agree to
become members of a larger one, which they intend to establish ...
A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption; the form of this society prevents all manner of
inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power, he could not be
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tionale for the thesis I want to defend. Decentralization constitutes a
supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to
have too great an influence over one, this would alarm the rest; were he to subdue a part,
that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those
which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
1 C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 126-27 (rev. ed. 1900). Whether fairly or not, Hamilton
built upon Montesquieu's thesis to defend the peculiar brand of decentralization in the new
American Constitution. The Federalist No. 9 (A. Hamilton). See also Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, in Essays in Federalism 21 (1961). Madison worried not that an
authoritarian few might gain control, but rather than an "unjust and interested majority"
might be permitted to accomplish its "secret wishes" through factions. The Federalist No. 10,
at 61 (J. Madison). Yet he trusted federalism to put obstacles in the way of anyone who would
gain and hold power to the detriment of liberty:
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States,
but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States ....
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican
remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the
degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
Id. at 61-62. See also The Federalist No. 51 (J. Madison): "In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people." Id. at 339. See Nagel,
Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 81, 88 (noting that the Framers sought to maintain freedom primarily through structural
allocations of governmental power, not by granting individual rights). The analytic linkage
between federal structure and individual liberty is noted routinely in discussions of American
government. Benson, for example, lists as the first value protected by federalism that it establishes a "bulwark against usurpation of governmental power by a would-be dictator." Benson,
Values of Decentralized Government, in Essays in Federalism 1, 3 (1961). While he concerns
himself primarily with economic matters not relevant here, he identifies an older, more fundamental tenet of political theory:
In the past, "usurpation of power" was thought of primarily in terms of military
force or of political coercion. In 1788 the anti-federalists were concerned about the
disproportionate strength of a President who was commander-in-chief of all the national
armed forces, and they urged safeguards for the local militia and for the state control of
some military and police power. Even now, we would be wise not to scoff too readily at
the possibility of "involuntary servitude" of our population. Within our lifetime other
nations-presumably liberty-loving-have succumbed to the sheer force of a tyrannic
central government. In this sense, it is probably still important that we have a number
of governors and mayors-often of an "opposition" party-who possess the physical
means of opposing a proposed military coup d'etat.
Id. at 5. Similar, if less graphic, statements pepper the relevant literature.
The first feature in the governmental system of the United States to which I will call
attention as bearing upon the problem I am handling is that it is Federal
Government ...
In this distribution of governmental powers between two or more sets of governmental organs there is a certain security that the realm of Individual Immunity against
governmental power will not be encroached upon.
J. Burgess, The Reconciliation of Government with Liberty 303 (1915). See also, e.g., Lee,
Legislative and Judicial Questions, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 35 (1984). But see J. Choper,
Judicial Review and the National Political Process 244 (1980) (denying that the institution of
federalism protects liberty); W. Biker, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance 154-55
(1964) (arguing that federalism serves the ends of racial oppression).
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structural defense for individual freedom, quite apart from the textbound doctrines that dominate Supreme Court opinions and most of the
relevant literature. There was, if you will, method in the apparent madness of diffusing power into the conceded chaos of multiple layers of govemnment. That stratagem prevents and, indeed, was designed to prevent
the concentration of power in the hands of centralized authority, where it
might lend itself to the purposes of despotism. In a rough approximation
of an even older, divide-and-conquer strategy, federalism anticipates that
antilibertarian forces might come to power in a single state. Yet the
practical impossibility of gaining a foothold everywhere at once will preserve the other states and, ultimately, the union itself from oppression.
None of this means that modem extensions of national power at the expense of state prerogatives are uniformly unwise or unconstitutional. No
one seriously laments the decline of nineteenth century dualism, 183 and
occasional efforts to recapture that kind of rigidity have been deservedly
unsuccessful. 184 We do well, however, to recognize the legitimate functions of decentralization and to fashion our policies, as well as our constitutional doctrine, accordingly. The task at hand is to identify those
matters for which national authority presents the most danger. As to
those matters, decision making responsibility should be allocated to state
government.
Few instruments of social control can match the making and enforcement of substantive criminal law for sheer coercive capacity. The
authority to declare what behavior will be condemned and the form and
severity of punishments promises the most effective means for commanding conformity to the will of those in power. The authority to fashion
substantive standards carries with it an entitlement to establish enforcement machinery-investigators, prosecutors, and courts. The more concentrated the decision-making authority and the more broad-reaching
the range of that authority, the more sweeping the capacity of enforcement officials to demand adherence to substantive policies. 18 5 I do not
183 See, e.g., New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837). Professor Corwin defined dual federalism as a constitutional system in which the national government is one of
enumerated powers only; the purposes the national government can promote are few; within
their respective spheres, states and the national government are "sovereign" and hence
"equal;" and the relation of the states and the national government is one of tension, rather
than collaboration. See Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1950).
See also Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1063 (1984) (lamenting the apparent renewal of dual federalist thinking). It
would nevertheless be inadvisable for Congress to set about fashioning a "whole catalogue of
crimes." See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1882) (defining the extent of congressional power to establish substantive criminal law).
184 See e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
185 It is familiar history, for example, that the eighteenth amendment, followed by the Vol-
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mean to invoke hyperbole, but there are nations on earth in which a
ubiquitous central police force, charged with enforcing policies generated
at the national level and coupled with a judicial system that depends for
its existence upon favor in high places, can bend to a despotic will. The
18 6
abuse of substantive criminal law in such nations is a matter of record.
Repression will not necessarily follow the assignment of authority
for the criminal law to any government national in scope. Indeed, it can
be argued that the decentralized American system is atypical and that
there are centralized criminal justice systems in which individual liberty
is respected.18 7 Nevertheless, decentralization in this country is no historical accident. If the concentration of power over the criminal law at
the national level does not inevitably threaten liberty, it surely lends itself
to manipulation that the diffusion of decision-making authority makes
more difficult. There are reasons for leaving the making of substantive
criminal law to state legislatures and, indeed, county and city councils,
reasons for choosing and training police officers at the local level, and
reasons for assigning the charging function to local prosecutors, whether
or not elected. Criminal law enforcement is one of those "integral govstead Act, generated a national police force charged with enforcing an unpopular federal law
in the face of widespread violations. See H. Johnston, What Rights Are Left 26 (1930). The
Supreme Court was then forced to consider seriously the meaning of the fourth amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure. See Wilson, Attempts to Nullify the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, 32 W. Va. L.Q. 128, 128 (1926); see generally F.
Black, Ill-Starred Prohibition Cases (1931).
I hardly want to be understood to insist that federalism demands that we deliberately
construct ineffective mechanisms for the detection and prosecution of crime. Much criminal
activity crosses state lines, and cooperative enforcement efforts among the states may require
national coordination. See, e.g., M. Grodzins, supra note 178, at 89-124. At the same time, in
my view, modem proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the police function should also
consider the impact upon the allocation of governmental authority so essential to the maintenance of freedom. Legislative plans that put efficiency first and neglect the dangers to individual rights that centralization can bring, see, e.g., Specter & Michel, The Need for a New
Federalism in Criminal Justice, 462 The Annals 59 (1982) (advocating federal jurisdiction for
the prosecution of certain career criminals), should be looked upon with suspicion. In this
regard, the Reagan Administration has things backward. Compare Final Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1981) (urging measures establishing greater national responsibility in controlling street crime) with The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982:
Hearings on § 2216 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-34 (1982)
(section-by-section analysis by the U.S. Dep't of Justice) (urging restrictions on the availability
of habeas for state prisoners). See also Armed Career Criminal Act of 1983, S. 52, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Jan. 26, 1983) (proposing to permit the prosecution of multiple offenders in federal
court and to impose enhanced sentences).
186 E.g., A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956 (T.Whitney trans. 1978); J.
Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (T. Talbot trans. 1981).
Abuses have also occurred within the United States. See, e.g., D. Carter, Scottsboro (1969); F.
Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927); T. Wilson, The Black Codes of the South
(1965).
187Examples include England and most of the civil law countries of Europe.
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ernmental functions"18 8 for which state governments were created.
Some Justices have acknowledged as much, even as the Court has (properly) sustained the establishment of federal crimes that have doubtful impact upon interstate commerce.1 89 As long as key decisions and
functions are left to officials who answer to no central authority, the present system resists the subordination of the criminal law to calculated
political ends of national moment. The republic is not so fragile that it
will surrender to authoritarianism on the signal provided by a foolish and
isolated failure to respect the reasons for federalism in criminal justice.
Yet neglect of elemental principles that serve prophylactic functions risks
disaster.
It is insufficient alone that local bodies draft criminal codes and that
state officers investigate suspects and prefer charges. The adjudicatory
proceedings that follow are crucial to local control of the criminal law.
It is impossible to separate the establishment of substantive standards of
behavior from their enforcement. Legislative objectives are identified
and given practical meaning when courts implement the criminal law in
concrete cases. 190 Only if state courts are allowed to do their assigned
work can it be said that criminal law is safely in the hands of local authorities and beyond the effective reach of centralized control. State
criminal process may fail occasionally, or even systematically, to identify
those criminal defendants whom the legislature deems blameworthy. Yet
local process with all its faults is essential to, indeed, part and parcel of,
the criminal law enterprise at the local level. The removal of state criminal prosecutions to the federal forum for trial would test the grip of local
authorities on substantive criminal law policy. Local standards, torn
188 NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851.
189 E.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (insisting that "[t]he States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law"); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 201 (1977) (stating that "preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of
the States than it is of the Federal Government"); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 158
(1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers "never intended that the National
Government might define as a crime and prosecute. . wholly local activity"). The Court has
likewise found it prudent to construe federal criminal legislation narrowly in order to preserve
"the traditional balance between the States and the national government in law enforcement."
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 105 (1945). The same sentiment leads to deference in
reviewing state substantive criminal law policies. In the notorious case of Francis v. Resweber,
Justice Frankfurter refused to hold that a second attempt to execute the petitioner would be
invalid, primarily out of deference to the state's "penological policy." 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding a
mandatory life sentence for multiple petty thefts). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
(invalidating a similar sentence that lacked possibility of parole). State legislative and judicial
judgments regarding the procedural safeguards accorded to defendants in criminal cases have
never enjoyed the same blanket deference. See note 7 supra.
190 See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 197 (1983).
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away from local institutions before they are hammered into authoritative
shape by the state courts, may feel the influence of concerns generated
elsewhere.
There is little reason to fear, however, that federal court enforcement of federal criminal procedure could be employed as a tool of oppression. The purpose of federal procedural safeguards is to ensure not
only accuracy, but fairness as elaborated in the Bill of Rights and cases
construing it.1'1 Procedural standards for the benefit of criminal defendants can safely be established and orchestrated at the national level,
and, indeed, should be uniform across the country.1 92 The task is to hold
state authorities accountable and to insist that they fashion and enforce
substantive criminal policies without denying fair process to individuals
haled into court to answer charges. It is appropriate that this function be
given to neutral authorities having no allegiance to state policies and
whose primary responsibility is to protect the individual even if local
objectives are frustrated.1 9 3 Whatever may have been the case prior to
the Civil War, the inauguration of the fourteenth amendment, and surely
its interpretation in this century, suggests that federal primacy in matters
of procedure is consistent with the constitutional scheme. 194 If the ex191Id. at 200-02; see Tribe, Unraveling NationalLeague of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1101 n.136
(1977) (linking the federalism concerns associated with National League of Cities with the
concern in Younger v. Harris that the states' substantive decisions regarding criminal law not
be disturbed-but distinguishing the asserted preference that the state courts have the initial
opportunity to enforce federal procedural safeguards in criminal cases).
192 Uniformity was, of course, a primary theme in Justice Black's campaign on behalf of
incorporation theory. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (insisting that the states should not be permitted "to experiment with the protections
afforded [by] the Bill of Rights"). Professor Cox has argued that Congress has power under
§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment to establish a criminal procedure code to be followed in state
prosecutions. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 108 (1966). See also Mayers,
Federal Review of State Convictions: The Need for Procedural Reappraisal, 34 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 615, 623 (1966) (advocating the establishment of "uniform nation-wide" requirements to
be followed by state courts treating federal claims).
193 Cf. Posner, supra note 141, at 175 (suggesting that cases involving substantive matters
governed by state law should be assigned to state courts-but acknowledging that when federal
interests arise the federal courts may be more enthusiastic enforcement tribunals). See also id.
at 173-74 (suggesting that state law enforcement agencies and state courts may be more vulnerable to corruption). Other observers have suggested that early federal involvement ought to be
more palatable in criminal than in civil cases, because the threat to federal rights may be more
pronounced in the criminal setting. See, e.g., Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29
Stan. L. Rev. 1191, 1213 (1977). Routine removal, however, would present the greater, incalculable danger of abuse. Although similar concerns can be asserted with respect to other state
substantive policies, the dangers there are less grave. See, e.g., Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1210-22 (1977) (appraising the functions of federalism in a discussion of
federal environmental policy that may displace individual state policies).
194 See text accompanying notes 160-65 supra.
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cesses of state authorities in furthering their policies must be checked, it
is vital that the federal courts have the last word. They do. The vehicle
by which they exercise their authority is not original jurisdiction in criminal cases, but postconviction habeas corpus. In the final analysis, it is
not that the state courts are not good courts, nor even that they are or
have been insensitive to federal rights. It is that the responsibility for
policing state respect for procedural safeguards is best left to independent
referees, unencumbered by the additional, and arguably inconsistent, obligation to implement state criminal law policies. This separation of
functions, which places the construction and implementation of criminal
law policy with state authorities but assigns the enforcement of federal
procedural safeguards owed to the accused to the federal courts, is central to the federal system we have and have had for a hundred years.
IV
IMPLICATIONS

The explanation for habeas I want to propose has implications for
the Younger v. Harris19 5 line of cases, the cases on preclusion generally,
and some aspects of current habeas corpus doctrine.
A.

The Younger Cases

The effect of my explanation for postconviction habeas on the
Younger line of cases appears on two levels. The result in the original
case can be accommodated; the Court held only that in the absence of
special circumstances the federal courts should not enjoin pending state
criminal proceedings.1 96 A decision to allow early federal intervention in
the run of cases would have posed the same difficulties that the removal
of state criminal cases for trial would present. 197 Accordingly, federal
adjudication can and should be deferred until after the state courts have
completed their work-at which time relitigation in habeas should be
available.1 98 Unfortunately, Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
195 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Id. at 54.
See text accompanying notes 170-94 supra.
198 The core ideas in the Younger cases can be brought within this framework. The premise
of those cases, to be sure, is that the state courts are fully competent to decide federal issues.
See note 149 supra. And, in the Court's eyes, the consequence of Younger abstention is not the
postponement but the relinquishment of (lower) federal court concern for the federal claims in
issue. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). Then, too, the primary focus in
Younger cases has often been the avoidance of interference with state courts rather than the
enforcement of state substantive law. That accounts for Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974), in which the absence of a pending state prosecution permitted a federal court to entertain a request for a declaratory judgment. Accord Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406
U.S. 498, 509 (1972). See also Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the
196
197
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Younger contained the seeds of quite different thinking. To begin, he
relied, in part, on the "basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts
of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at
law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." 199
There was no reason, however, to depend upon rules fashioned for equity
practice to decide the entirely different question whether litigants should
be able to thwart pending state court litigation by invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. If matters such as the availability of an "adequate remedy at law" help to decide whether a court should issue an
injunction or award damages, and one tends to doubt it, they promise
Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 266, 285-86 (1976). At the same time, however, Justice Black's opinion in Younger spoke broadly of state attempts to carry out "the important ... task of
enforcing... laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be
punishable," 401 U.S. at 51-52, and indicated a preference for litigation in the state forum,
thus "permitting the smooth and unimpeded operation of the collection of procedures that
make up the normal course of criminal justice." Section 1983 Developments, supra note 162,
at 1283. Ideas of that kind can claim a pedigree in precursor decisions that, I concede, richly
deserve their unpopularity. See, e.g., Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 397 (1963) (expressing
the desire to avoid disrupting a "State's enforcement of its criminal law"); Stefanelli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951) (referring to the prosecution of "crimes solely within the power of the
States").
Finally, and here I tread on truly dangerous ground, the extension of Younger to cases in
which litigants seek injunctive relief against executive actions also reflects the belief that the
making and enforcement of substantive criminal law is best left to local control. See, e.g.,
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976) (expressing reservations about interfering with
the conduct of a governmental body's "internal affairs"); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
500 (1974) (worrying over any "ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings"). Rizzo
and O'Shea were incorrectly decided. The Court has recognized that there are instances in
which federal safeguards are threatened so severely by state law enforcement officers that early
federal intervention is warranted, see, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814-16 (1974)
(involving systematic police intimidation of union organizers), and it should have recognized
that circumstances of that kind obtained in Cairo, Illinois (O'Shea) and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Rizzo). When the Justices relied on "principles of federalism" to shirk federal responsibility, they breached the very promise made in Younger-that the federal courts will not
accord "blind deference" to the states, but will examine rigorously the particular federalism
values at stake in a case and key the exercise of federal judical power accordingly. Younger,
401 U.S. at 44. See also Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165, 1183 n.59, 1193-94 (1977);
Weinberg, supra note 193, at 1222-27 (1977) (insisting that the decree set aside in Rizzo did not
threaten effective law enforcement and that the Court actually disregarded the federal interest
in the enforcement offederal law). I mean only that judicial recognition of the libertarian
purpose of lodging responsibility for the substantive criminal law at the local level is surely
welcome. The difficulty is that it is often voiced in grandly inappropriate circumstances. See,
e.g., Allee, 416 U.S. at 836 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (insisting that state law
enforcement officers must,have "broad discretion" and that state courts must be permitted to
interpret state law and superintend state prosecutions initiated under that law). Of course, the
transcendent difficulty in Rizzo, O'Shea, and Allee is the need for class-based, prospective relief
in the criminal context.
199401 U.S. at 43-44.
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little assistance in resolving the choice-of-forum problem presented in

Younger cases. Just as the "custody" doctrine in habeas fails adequately
to explain relitigation of claims in federal court, the factors counseling
"equitable restraint" fail to explain the circumstances in which federal
relief should be available prior to judgment in state court.2°° The forumallocation question should turn not on historical doctrines refurbished
for new functions, but on a reasoned determination of whether and when
the federal courts should be open to resolve litigants' disputes with state
authorities.
More recent decisions seem to recognize this point. The Justices
have abandoned the language of equity jurisprudence in explaining their
hesitancy to allow early federal intervention and have substituted more
general references to federalism and comity. 201 The Court's separation of

20 2
the doctrine of restraint from equity generally should be applauded.
In abandoning reliance on equitable doctrines, however, the Court has
ceased to limit Younger to criminal proceedings, as if it were only the
equitable rule against enjoining criminal proceedings that linked Younger
restraint to criminal cases in the first instance. The Court now seems
committed to federal restraint in noncriminal cases in which state officers
initiate litigation in state court to further important state policies. 20 3 In
those cases, however, relitigation in habeas is unavailable. For even as
they have discarded reliance on maxims of equity and, in that way, have
justified extending Younger to civil actions, the Justices have seized upon
200 Professor Fiss has developed the point. Fiss, supra note 72, at 1107. See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120-21 & n.4 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (doubting the advisability of permitting equitable considerations to make the forum allocation choice between final adjudication in the state or federal courts).
201 In Huffrman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1975), for example, the Court acknowledged Younger's reliance on equitable restraint, but then concentrated attention on comity-also mentioned in Younger and, indeed, identified by Justice Black as a consideration
"even more vital" than the equity rule barring injunctions against criminal proceedings.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Huffman further proposed that Younger had been "based" on "comity and federalism." 420 U.S. at 602. That shift
was necessary in order to extend Younger beyond the criminal context to state proceedings
which are at best only "in aid of" state criminal policies. Id. at 604.
202 I do not mean to contradict Professors Soifer and Macgill, who complain that the
Court's turn to comity and federalism and away from Younger's roots in equity has unleashed
"Our Federalism" to frustrate federal litigation in a wide range of cases. Soifer & Macgill, The
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1185 (1977). The
impact of the Younger idea might have been diminished if it had been restricted to criminal
cases by reference to the traditional rule in equity. Yet such an explanation for Younger would
have been indefensible. There is no principled basis for asking the rules of equity to orchestrate the distribution of judicial business between the federal and state courts. Fiss, supra note
72, at 1107.
203 See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982) (attorney discipline); Trainor v. Herandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (civil fraud); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (contempt).
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another kind of formalism, the "custody" doctrine, to restrict habeas to
the criminal context.204 In this, "custody" does double duty-explaining
and justifying an opportunity for relitigation in some instances, but, at
the same time, limiting drastically the occasions on which relitigation
will actually be permitted. The result is that in a large body of cases
federal adjudication of federal claims is foreclosed both early and late.
The Court's reasoning is flawed. The reference in Younger to the
rule against enjoining criminal proceedings was in essence only an attempt to articulate a broad preference for state court enforcement of the
substantive criminal law. There are reasons for declining to interfere
with state criminal proceedings that have nothing to do with chancery's
traditional refusal to enjoin criminal prosecutions. They are the same
reasons it is inappropriate to permit state criminal defendants to remove
their prosecutions to federal court for trial. 20 5 Because civil actions are
not accompanied by the threat to liberty posed by centralized control of
the criminal law, however, the reasons for exercising restraint do not apply to them. In Younger, itself a criminal case, the Court drew the right
distinction for the wrong reasons. It only compounds error now to disregard the important differences between criminal and civil cases merely
because it appears, on reflection, that the Court's original basis for distinguishing the two was unsound.
The error is not yet at an end. The extension of federal restraint to
the civil context contemplates that collateral review in habeas will not be
available and, accordingly, that federal adjudication apart from direct
review in the Supreme Court may be foreclosed entirely. Having taken
this ground, the Court has evidently found it a short next step to deploy
the process model in justification of its decisions. The Justices have said
on several occasions that restraint should be exercised if state court proceedings offer would-be federal litigants a fair opportunity to litigate federal claims. 20 6 This means in effect that, whenever possible, the Court
See text accompanying notes 24-31 supra.
See text accompanying notes 170-94 supra.
See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975) (finding injunctive relief appropriate because the federal plaintiffs would not be able to raise their federal claim at their upcoming trials). Justice Stevens has argued repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, that federal restraint
is inappropriate in any case in which the federal plaintiff challenges the federal validity of the
very state procedure that she would be forced to employ should Younger be invoked. See, e.g.,
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 469 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 340-41 (1977) (concurring opinion). That approach coincides with the arguments made
by Professor Bator in the habeas context. See Bator, supra note 78, at 455-59. The Court's
majority, however, has preferred to resolve doubts in favor of federal restraint. See Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 n.10 (1979) (rejecting the contention that "a constitutional attack on
state procedures automatically vitiates the adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the
Younger-Huffman line of cases"). In Trainor, however, the Court summarily affirmed when,
on remand, the court below explicitly held that state law precluded the federal claim the plain204
205
206
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will redirect litigants with federal claims to state court rather than allowing them to proceed in federal court. 20 7 It has, indeed, become commonplace for the Court to drive litigants with federal claims into state
court until a judgment has been rendered that is entitled to preclusive
effect. 20 8 The application of the process model in this context was admittiff wished to raise. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Quern v. Hernandez, 440 U.S. 951 (1979).
207 The Younger cases are, perhaps, the best illustrations, but the Court's various abstention
decisions also make the point. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071
(1974); Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590 (1977).
208 This purpose is accomplished by the combination of three recent decisions. In Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the Court held that a federal district court should have invoked
Younger when state authorities instituted state enforcement proceedings after a federal plaintiff
had filed a complaint but before any proceedings of substance had taken place in federal court.
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the Court held that state proceedings are still
pending for Younger purposes through the appellate stages. And in Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980), the Court held that issues actually litigated in state court will be subject to
ordinary collateral estoppel rules should a disappointed litigant seek collateral review in subsequent federal proceedings. Other observers have noted the combined effect of Hicks and
Huffman in excluding litigants from federal court. See Society of American Law Teachers,
Supreme Court Denial of Citizen Access to Federal Courts to Challenge Unconstitutional or
Other Unlawful Actions: The Record of the Burger Court (1976); Soifer & Macgill, supra note
202; Bartels, supra note 168, at 29-30. With the addition of Allen, the exclusionary effect truly
becomes final.
The Court's curious resurrection of the eleventh amendment promises similar preclusive
results. In the wake of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984),
unless the eleventh amendment is waived or otherwise avoided, the federal district courts lack
power to entertain state law claims against state officers. A litigant that has both state and
federal claims presumably may file lawsuits in state and federal court simultaneously. The
federal court, then, can adjudicate the federal claim, while the state court treats the state law
claim. This course is, however, both burdensome and dangerous, for under Government &
Civic Employees Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957), it seems the litigant must
present the state court with the federal claim as well, in order to permit that court to appraise
the state claim in a federal light. When a litigant is forced in an abstention case to submit
federal claims to a state court, the litigant is permitted to preserve her entitlement to return to
federal court with the federal claim. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964). It is unclear, however, whether the same opportunity to preserve federal
claims would be respected in the Younger context. See Board of Regents of Univ. of New
York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 496-97 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that an express reservation should be effective in similar circumstances). If it is not, and the state court
purports to decide the federal issue before the federal court acts, the state court judgment may
be given preclusive effect. The likelihood that the state court might reach a conclusion first
would be enhanced, of course, if the federal court were to stay its own proceedings in deference
to parallel litigation in state court. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U'S. 800, 817-20 (1976) (finding dismissal by a federal court in light of state court
proceedings appropriate). Preclusion ordinarily would be the result if the litigant were to sue
only in state court on the state law claim, withholding the federal claim in hopes of raising it
later in an independent federal lawsuit, and the federal court determined that the federal claim
would be precluded in subsequent proceedings in state court. Migra v. Warren City School
Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (decided with Pennhurst). But see Marrese v. American
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tedly prefigured by language in the original Younger opinion. While declaring that federal injunctions against state proceedings are usually
improper, Justice Black recognized that federal courts may relent upon a
showing of "bad faith and harassment" or other "extraordinary circumstances. '20 9 This language can be assimilated into the process model conception that the federal forum should be open if there is a breakdown in
state judicial machinery. 210 It is not surprising that the Court should
establish exceptions to its policy against early federal intervention or that
it should recruit the process model to emphasize the point that, there
being good reasons to leave the criminal law to the states, any reasons
offered for interfering with state processes at mid-stream ought also be
good. 2 11 The criminal defendant in Younger, however, would have his
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1335 (1985)(recognizing that there will be
exceptions in some instances).
209 Younger, 401 U.S. at 53.
210 In Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975), the Court said that a "bad faith" prosecution
is one brought "without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction." Id. at 126
n.6. If that is the case, then Professor Fiss is probably correct in collapsing the "bad faith" test
into concerns regarding the opportunity afforded litigants to litigate federal claims in state
court. If state proceedings are initiated for purposes other than to obtain a valid judgment, it
cannot be expected they will offer an adequate opportunity for the adjudication of federal
claims. Fiss, supra note 72, 1114-15. But see Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger:
The View From Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 29-40 (arguing that federal courts
since Younger have granted injunctive relief in cases of obvious bad faith prosecution). Some
cases have suggested that "bad faith" and "harassment" are distinct justifications for federal
intervention. These two concepts were stated in the disjunctive in Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611.
In Moore, 442 U.S. at 432, the Court addressed "harassment" separately, but with extraordinary dispatch. Still, Fiss's view is more plausible. A prosecution is pursued in "bad faith"
when there is no anticipation of a valid conviction and the only true purpose is to "harass" the
defendant. Fiss, supra note 72, at 1115 n.34. See also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 97
(1971) (Brennan, J.,concurring) (referring to "bad-faith harassment"). Compare Fiss, supra
note 72, at 1118 (finding it unlikely that one should be found without the other) with M.
Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 304 n.98 (1980)
(suggesting that "harassment" may contemplate multiple proceedings and positing a case in
which a single prosecution is initiated in "bad faith").
Justice Black gave only one illustration of "any other unusual circumstance" in
Younger-prosecution under a "'flagrantly and patently"' invalid statute. 401 U.S. at 53
(quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387,402 (1941)). Since then, however, the Court has found
no statute to be that troubling, and, indeed, apparently has merged this single illustration of
"extraordinary circumstances" into the question of whether state proceedings offer a fair opportunity to litigate a federal claim. See Kugler, 421 U.S. at 126 n.6 (noting that the "gravamen" of the plaintiff's complaint was that "it [was] impossible for him to receive a fair hearing
in the state-court system" where the "extraordinary circumstances" allegation was that members of the state supreme court had coerced the plaintiff into giving grand jury testimony
leading to the prosecution sought to be enjoined).
211 I do not argue that when the exceptions recognized in Younger are met, state criminal
defendants should still be required to stand trial in state court before being entitled to the
federal forum. That much concession to the process model is tolerable, even essential, and in
any event inconsequential. The exceptions to the general rule against early federal interference
are so narrow that they will admit only a trivial number of cases into federal court for original
adjudication. The reason is plain enough. To conclude that early federal intervention is avail-
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day in federal court later in habeas. Justice Black invoked the process
model not to foreclose federal examination of federal claims entirely, but
rather simply to postpone federal adjudication to an appropriate time.
More recently, the Court has not confined the process model to cases in

a rule of timing has been transwhich habeas will be available. 2Thus
12

formed into a rule of preclusion.
The Court's stated reason for limiting the availability of the federal
courts is concern both for the retention of state control of substantive
criminal law and for the maintenance of state autonomy. 2 13 The Court
worries that by recognizing any preference for federal adjudication of
federal claims, it might deny state legislatures and state courts the respect to which they are entitled in the federal system. Accordingly, the
Court lurches to the other extreme and proposes actually to prefer the
state courts. This is sloppy thinking. It comes too late, it ignores too
much, and it rests upon a blind faith in decentralization untroubled by
2 14
rigorous inquiry into underlying values. In Justice Rehnquist's hands,
able is to decide that pending state proceedings accord no fair opportunity to litigate federal
claims. Such a determination impugns the motives and capacities of the state officials concerned, including state judges. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court
Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 535, 587 (1970); cf. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (insisting that the same negative reflection on the state
courts is not implicated when a federal court awards declaratory relief in the absence of pending state proceedings). Even when litigants cannot meet the stringent requirements for early
federal involvement and are thus forced to litigate in state court in the first instance, they
should not be condemned by the same process model to accept the resulting state court judgment or to seek federal review of it only in the Supreme Court. The process model may determine the timing of federal adjudication. It may screen the wealth of criminal prosecutions
begun in state court for the comparatively rare cases in which federal adjudication should not
await judgment. It cannot operate to foreclose federal review in the lower courts altogether.
Of course, when an injunction against pending proceedings is properly issued, or when removal for trial is properly accomplished, disappointed litigants cannot later claim an entitlement to relitigation in habeas on the ground that they have a right to federal review. Federal
adjudication having been made available initially, any right to postconviction consideration
must rest on other bases. See note 2 supra.
212 The explanation for recent decisions is not merely analytic confusion or even the Court's
failure to appreciate the reasons for limiting restraint to state criminal cases. The litigant in
Huffman, 420 U.S. 592, a civil case, argued explicitly that Younger should not control because
habeas review would not be available after judgment. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist
recognized the argument and rejected it. Id. at 605-07. The Court, it appears, has reexamined
threshold arguments regarding the proper distribution ofjudicial business in the United States,
has concluded, at least in the Younger context, that federal and state courts are fungible for
purposes of adjudicating federal issues, and has placed decision-making authority with the
state courts. To reach this conclusion, a majority of the Justices must not only reject arguments favoring the right to adjudicate federal claims in a federal forum, but must also disregard the clear implications of current jurisdictional statutes and turn an astonishing about-face
on previous judicial statements. See text accompanying notes 131-65 supra.
213 See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman, 420 U.S. at 601.
214 See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 293, 317
(1976).
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and all too often in the hands of other Justices, 2 15 federalism is a code
word for routine and undifferentiated deference to the states and the state
courts in virtually any context. This understanding of federalism neglects the genuine meaning that decentralization has in criminal cases,
substituting labels for analysis. Things can be set right only if it is once
agreed that collateral rather than original federal adjudication is appropriate in criminal cases in light of the special, libertarian reasons for assigning responsibility for the making and enforcement of criminal law to
the states. Younger itself can be accommodated. What Younger has become cannot.
B. Preclusion
If relitigation in habeas demands special justification, it seems selfevident that collateral review should not ordinarily be available apart
from habeas. All the evidence is not in, but this appears to be the present
state of the law. 21 6 Cases in which prior judgments rendered by the state
courts are denied preclusive effect in later federal litigation are and
should be rare. Here, as in the Younger context, exceptions are identified
according to the process model. Just as Younger restraint is unwarranted
where state court proceedings do not offer a fair opportunity to litigate

federal claims, preclusion rules should not bar the relitigation in federal
court of claims and issues that litigants had no fair opportunity to pursue
in state proceedings.2 1 7 Otherwise, state court judgments, even regarding
215 Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court in the most extreme exercise of Younger restraint to date. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1033
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (complaining in a tenth amendment context that the Court
had surveyed "the battle scene of federalism" and sounded a "retreat"); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (Powell, J.) (relying upon the "principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine") (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 691 (1978)).
216 The Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a statutory exception to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 or ordinary federal preclusion rules. See note 50 supra. In Migra v. Warren City
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), however, the Court explicitly declined to address the question of whether § 1738 controls cases in which the would-be federal litigant was
not the moving party in state court. Id. at 85 n.7. Some observers have argued that relitigation should be permitted in such cases. See, e.g., Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After
State Court Judgment, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 191, 195-96 (1972); Theis, supra note 50, at 868.
But see Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1978).
217 Some Justices insist that federal preclusion rules take into account more than the question whether a litigant was accorded a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate a federal claim in
prior proceedings. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 n.7. (1983) (Marshall, J.) (reaffirming various "conditions" that must be satisfied before state determinations can be given
preclusive effect); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.) (arguing that the majority's discussion of preclusion had
failed to mention all the exceptions established by the Court's precedents). Other Justices
contend that the federal courts could constitutionally apply federal judge-made rules to pre-
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federal issues, are entitled to respect.
Use of the process model in this context does not conffict with the
view that litigants are entitled to litigate federal claims in a federal forum. If litigants with federal claims choose the federal forum initially,
they have the benefit of original federal adjudication. If, however, they
choose to litigate federal claims in state rather than in federal court, then
they must live with their choice.2 18 State court judgments regarding fedelude relitigation in cases in which litigants would not be precluded under relevant state rules.
See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984) (White, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and Powell, J.). The latter argument appears thwarted,
however, by the federal "full faith and credit" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), which instructs
the federal courts to give prior state judgments the "same" effect they would be accorded in the
courts of that state. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in
Federal Courts, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1723, 1738-39 (1968) (pointing out that the prior litigation in
state court presumably was undertaken with the expectation that the forum state's preclusion
policies would control in any subsequent lawsuit). For a discussion of the interplay between
preclusion and § 1738, see generally Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation:
Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Ind. L.J. 59 (1982); Degnan, Federalized
Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741 (1976).
When the question is the effect to be given one federal court's judgment by another federal
court in a later adjudication, the Supreme Court apparently feels free to fashion a federal
common law of preclusion. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394
(1981); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). The Court is ambivalent, however, about the federal effect to be accorded prior state court judgments. In some cases, the
Court has treated the problem as one of preclusion and therefore subject to the same federal
common law analysis established in cases wholly within the federal system. See, e.g., Brown v.
Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). In other cases,
the Court has invoked § 1738, limiting discussion to applicable state precedents as though they
alone control. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 105 S. Ct.
1327 (1985); Migra, 465 U.S. at 85; Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
The Court has held, however, that § 1738, too, admits of an exception if the state courts fail to
provide a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate federal claims. See, e.g., Haring,462 U.S. at
313; Allen, 449 U.S. at 101.
The Court has offered clear guidance regarding the meaning of such an "opportunity"
only in cases subject to § 1738, in which "state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the
minimal procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481.
This constitutional test is consistent with Bator's process model framework for habeas. See
note 110 supra. All told, the Court has been slow to set down clear standards in this fieldand properly so, given the many variables that may be taken into account in appraising the
effect that should be accorded prior state proceedings. See Castorr v. Brundage, 459 U.S. 928,
929-30 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
218 This assumes, of course, the change in removal jurisdiction treated earlier. See text
accompanying notes 166-69 supra. It is admittedly painful to deny access to the federal forum
to a litigant who in fact pursued relief in state court, but failed to recognize the significance of
that action. In blunt language, the question is whether litigants shouldforfeit the opportunity
to litigate in federal court simply because they failed to insist upon it seasonably, or whether
we should look closer, examine the surrounding circumstances, and foreclose relitigation only
if the litigant understood her options, genuinely chose the state forum, and thus waived her
right to invoke federal jurisdiction. The problems attending procedural default command their
own rich literature. See text accompanying notes 263-81 infra. Let me only say that I am less
concerned in this context than in others that litigants might be bound not only by the strategic
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eral claims are subject to direct review in the Supreme Court, and there is
no reason to accord litigants who voluntarily give up their right to litigate initially in federal court the possibility of collateral review-absent a
showing of flawed state process that frustrated treatment of their federal
claims.
C. Ramificationsfor Habeas
My purpose here has been to explain habeas corpus, not to advocate
significant changes in current doctrines and practices attending the writ.
Except for those aspects of current habeas practice that employ a process
model, my explanation for habeas is entirely consistent with existing law.
Accordingly, federal district courts should continue to adjudicate habeas
petitions, and their power should remain plenary-allowing for full relitigation of factual and legal issues. The "fundamental" nature of federal
claims, the apparent relationship of claims to "factual guilt," and the
"retroactivity problem" should have no bearing on petitioners' ability to
2 19
litigate federal claims in a federal district court.
The availability of collateral review in habeas cannot, however, be
explained by reference to the "custody" doctrine. The historical relationship between the writ and detention has no bearing on the question of
whether there should be relitigation in federal court. Although there
may be rhetorical value in associating the adjudication of fourteenth
amendment claims with the grand tradition of the Great Writ of Liberty,
neither the availability nor the timing of federal adjudication can rightly
turn on the label attached to the proceedings. Rather, habeas must be
explained by reference to normative decisions about the role of the federal courts. Specifically, collateral review in habeas is explained by the
underlying reasons for making federal adjudication available to state
criminal defendants and for deferring federal adjudication until after
state court proceedings have been concluded. 220 The "custody" requirement, as now understood and applied, is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of habeas, which is to assure access to the federal forum for
state criminal defendants raising federal claims. In order to conform
current practice to the postconviction writ's reason for being, either the
choices, but also by the negligent blunders, of counsel. See, e.g., Board of Regents of Univ. of
New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 496-97 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the problem and suggesting that litigants be asked to state their intentions unequivocally). Cf. City of
Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 907-09 (1979) (insisting that litigants cannot avoid
Younger by failing to comply with state procedural rules and in that way terminating state
proceedings before appellate judgment) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 n.22 (1975) (same).
219 See text accompanying notes 96-103 supra.
220 But see Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963), quoted in note 36 supra.
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definition of "custody" should be diluted still further, 22 1 or, if that is
intolerably duplicitous, the requirement should be deleted from section
2241. Thus, for example, petitioners who have been unconditionally discharged from prior detention or who were only fined as punishment after
criminal conviction should be able to seek federal relitigation. 222 They,
too, were denied an opportunity to choose the federal forum originally by
way of removal and, accordingly, they should be entitled to apply to the
federal courts collaterally. The "custody" doctrine need no longer carry
any justificatory weight in this respect.
What I have said entails no change in the exhaustion doctrine,
which requires habeas applicants to pursue fully their federal claims in
the state courts before seeking federal relief.223 Properly conceived, exhaustion determines only the timing of a habeas petition; it has nothing
to do with the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. 224 Indeed, my
alternative explanation for postconviction habeas essentially collapses
into the exhaustion doctrine. The decision to open the federal courts to
habeas claims is made independently. To say in addition that federal
adjudication should be postponed to allow the state courts an opportunity to correct their own mistakes of federal law is to contemplate that
would-be petitioners for federal relief will first raise their federal defenses
in state court. That, of course, is consistent with the view that the federal
225
courts should not interfere with state criminal proceedings early on.
It would be possible to permit litigants to raise only state law defenses in state court and to hold any federal claims they may have in
reserve for authoritative treatment in federal habeas. Yet that course
would needlessly discredit the state courts' ability and willingness to participate in the making and enforcement of federal law. In any event,
rational litigants would rarely adopt such a strategy. Safe in the knowledge that federal courts are available to reconsider federal issues treated
in state court, litigants now have, and would have under the regime I
envision, powerful incentives to raise and litigate their federal claims vig221 See text accompanying notes 32-43 supra.
222 See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra. If our Kansas prisoner wishes to attack a yetto-be-served sentence in Missouri, a habeas petition should be entertained even in the absence
of a "detainer." See note 42 supra.

223 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1977).
224 See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (affirming a district court's exercise of discretion in dismissing a petition filed by a prisoner held in custody while awaiting trial, but recognizing that the court had jurisdiction to grant the writ and that its refusal to do so did not
prejudice petitioner's right to renew the application later). I have worried in print that the
Court's recent decisions have given the exhaustion doctrine an improper jurisdictional flavor.
See Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return
to First Principles, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 393 (1983). But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 684 (1984) (reaffirming the nonjurisdictional character of the exhaustion doctrine).
225 See notes 172-94 and accompanying text supra.
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orously in state court. At best, the state courts, perhaps with a glance
over the shoulder at the federal habeas courts waiting in the wings, may
award relief when it is warranted-making it unnecessary even to petition the federal habeas courts for relitigation.2 2 6 At worst, the federal
courts will be available to correct any errors of federal law made by the
state courts that first treat federal claims. If, moreover, the legitimacy of
habeas were accepted without apology to the state courts, whose judgments are not in any realistic sense considered final, it would make sense
for the federal courts to be more flexible than they are now in the enforcement of the exhaustion doctrine. The habeas courts should conserve the effort they now squander on the threshold question whether
further resort to the state courts should be required and focus attention
more readily on the merits of claims for which they have primary
22 7
responsibility.
My explanation for postconviction habeas is less easily reconciled
with existing law in three instances in which the process model appears
to have been incorporated into habeas jurisprudence. These are, first,
federal factfinding in the wake of state court determinations of the same
factual issues; second, the treatment of fourth amendment exclusionary
rule claims in habeas; and, third, the federal effect given litigants' procedural defaults in state court.
1. FederalFactfinding
Chief Justice Warren said in Townsend v. Sain228 that a federal evidentiary hearing regarding disputed primary facts is mandatory in
habeas if the applicant was denied a "full and fair" hearing in state
court. 2 29 That was not to limit evidentiary hearings in habeas to in-

stances in which there was some flaw in state process; it was clear that
there is always power to hold an evidentiary hearing at the habeas court's
226 The Supreme Court ushered the lower federal courts into service in habeas to establish
the threat of federal override and thereby to encourage the state courts to treat federal issues
with care. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
227 At the moment, the Court's exhaustion doctrine decisions are very strict. See, e.g., An-

derson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam) (reversing a circuit decision that had concluded that the doctrine was satisfied); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (instructing habeas
courts to dismiss all claims in a single petition if state remedies have not been exhausted with
respect to any); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam) (insisting upon exhaustion even when the petitioner was clearly entitled to relief on the merits). Justice Stevens has
lamented that "[flew issues consume as much of the scarce time of federal judges as the question whether a state prisoner adequately exhausted his state remedies before filing a petition for
a federal writ of habeas corpus." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 8 (1982) (dissenting
opinion).
228 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
229 Id. at 312.
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discretion. 230 Nevertheless, Warren made use of the process model to
distinguish cases in which a federal hearing must be held from those in
which it is permissible to rely upon hearings conducted in state court. A
more recent statute, building upon Townsend, attaches another processoriented layer to the factfinding structure in habeas. Assuming that a
federal evidentiary hearing is held, section 2254(d) 23' requires the federal
district court to presume the accuracy of factual findings made by state
courts of competent jurisdiction, provided that the record of the state
proceedings can satisfy various tests for procedural regularity. 232 An applicant can rebut the presumption only by producing "convincing" evidence that the state courts were in error. Section 2254(d) thus applies
the process model in cases not addressed in Townsend, limiting federal
court discretion to make independent findings unless there was some
2 33
breakdown in state factfinding machinery.
The process model properly plays no role in habeas courts' factfinding function, especially given the importance of factfinding with respect
to federal claims. 234 Townsend was in error to allow federal habeas
courts to rely upon the work of the state courts for vitally significant
elements of their jurisdiction. Because habeas constitutes the petitioner's
long-postponed opportunity to litigate a federal claim in federal court, it
is entirely reasonable that the federal adjudication now made available
should be independent of the state adjudication that preceded it. If
habeas courts rely upon state determination of facts that may have a
bearing on ultimate conclusions of law, criminal defendants who were
initially denied access to a federal forum will never enjoy the full measure
of federal adjudication that the writ ostensibly promises. Yet it is late in
the day to insist that the federal courts can never make use of state
factfinding, but rather must relitigate all questions of fact. 235 The error
in Townsend may not, in the end, require explicit disapproval of that
case. Townsend focused upon the value, and even the necessity, of federal factfinding in most habeas cases. It is thus sufficient if the federal
Id. at 318.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977). See note 17 supra.
232 These tests track roughly the more elaborate definition of a "full and fair" hearing provided in Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313-18.
233 I have said elsewhere that if a state court finding is once presumed correct under the
statute and the petitioner is invited to rebut that presumption with "convincing" evidence
showing the finding to be erroneous, "[t]he matter shifts.
from a structural appraisal of the
state fact-finding procedure to a substantive review of the results reached, as to evidentiary
facts, in state court." L. Yackle, supra note 23, § 134, at 508.
234 See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
235 See generally Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 Yale L.J. 895 (1966).
230
231
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habeas courts keep that emphasis in mind as they invoke Townsend in
deciding whether to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.
Recent cases applying the "presumption of correctness" in section
2254(d) underscore this point. It is accepted as a matter of statutory
construction that the presumption works only in favor of state determinations of primary, basic, evidentiary, historical facts and has nothing to
do with legal issues or "mixed" questions of law and fact. 236 In Brown v.
Allen, Justice Frankfurter defined "basic," or "primary" facts as facts "in
the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators"; 237 in Townsend, Chief Justice Warren explained that "mixed"
questions "require the application of a legal standard to... historicalfact determinations." 238 The Court's recent cases, however, are not true
to that distinction, albeit there may be close cases to be placed on one
side of the line or the other. 239 The Justices have properly held that the
"voluntariness" of a defendant's confession24° and the effectiveness of
counsel 24 1 are "mixed" issues not covered by the statute. Yet they have
concluded that the "partiality" 242 or "bias" 243 of jurors, and have implied that the "competency" of prisoners to stand trial, 244 are questions
of primary fact to which the statutory presumption applies. Small wonder, with these cases for guidance, that the lower courts are in "disarray" 245 over the application of section 2254(d). 246 The expansion of the
category of questions characterized as issues of primary fact, and thus
236 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854 n.8 (1985) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980)); see also Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982) (per curiam)
(acknowledging that the "constitutionality of the pretrial identification procedures used in this
case is a mixed question of law and fact that is not governed by § 2254(d)") (footnote omitted).
237 344 U.S. 433, 506 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
238 372 U.S. at 309 n.6.
239 See, e.g., Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. at 855 (explaining that "[i]t will not always be easy to
separate questions of 'fact' from 'mixed questions of law and fact' ") (citation omitted).
240 Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985).
241 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980) (holding that the existence of a conflict of
interest resulting from multiple representation is a "mixed" question).
242 See Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2891 (1984); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.
114, 120 (1983) (per curiam) (holding that the effect of ex parte communications on juror
impartiality is a question of historical fact). But see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 n.*
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that, in "exceptional situations" in which the impartiality of a juror is in doubt, a federal court may find bias "implied" and "need not be deterred
by [§ 2254(d)]").
243 See Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. at 855.
244 See Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (per curiam). But see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 174-75 & n.10 (1975).
245 Texas v. Mead, 104 S. Ct. 1318, 1322 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
246 The Third Circuit has concluded that recent Supreme Court cases can only be understood to say (in actions louder than words) that § 2254 does apply to state determinations of
"mixed" questions. Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 931-32 (3d Cir. 1984).
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subject to a presumption of correctness, threatens the core idea in
habeas-that state court judgments regarding substantive federal claims
are open for reexamination by the lower federal courts. 247 Section
2254(d) therefore should be confined to factual issues that cannot arguably be considered "mixed."
2.

The Exclusionary Rule

The Court has also employed process model language in Stone v.
Powell,248 in which Justice Powell, writing for the Court, held that fourth
amendment exclusionary rule claims would no longer be entertained in
federal habeas unless the applicant was denied an "opportunity" for "full
and fair litigation" in state court. 249 Several explanations have been offered for Stone.250 There is reason to believe, for example, that the
Court's primary emphasis was on the revision of the exclusionary rule
25
and that the case had little to do with the scope of federal habeas. '
Stone can plausibly be understood, however, to advocate application of
252
the process model to habeas generally.
Two observations are in order. First, it is dangerous to fasten upon
the similarities between and among analytically related ideas at the expense of their apparently distinguishable descriptions and functions. It is
not necessarily true that precisely the same ideas are reflected in the
Court's references in Younger to "bad faith harassment" or "other extraordinary circumstances, ' 253 in other Younger cases to the denial of an
"opportunity" to litigate in state court, 2 54 in the preclusion cases to the
absence of a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate, 255 in Townsend to the
247 See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 142 n.22 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (making
the point explicitly). The Spain case provides a good illustration. A per curiam opinion acknowledged that the "final decision" whether constitutional error was "harmless" is "one of
federal law" not subject to § 2254(d). Id. at 120. Nevertheless, in the case at bar, the state
court's determination that the jury's deliberations "as a whole, were not biased" was entitled to
the presumption. Once that finding was given effect, in the absence of "convincing" evidence
that it was erroneous, the habeas court below should have concluded that the alleged constitu-

tional error was, indeed, harmless. The federal court was obliged to defer to a state finding of
"fact" which, once accepted, virtually concluded the further, legal issue on which the habeas
court was entitled to exercise independent judgment. Id.
248 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
249 Id. at 494.

250 See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 67, at 1086-1100; Halpern, Federal Habeas
Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1982);
Robbins & Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the Appearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of
Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (Or More) with One Stone, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 63
(1977); Seidman, supra note 101, at 449-59.
251 See note 101 supra.

252 See, e.g., Peller, supra note 84, at 594-602; Resnick, supra note 74, at 892-95.
253 See text accompanying notes 209-11 supra.
254 Id.

255 See note 217 and accompanying text supra.
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absence of state court litigation that was "full and fair, '2 56 and in Stone
to the denial of an "opportunity" for "full and fair litigation" of fourth
amendment claims. 257 Even in the context of the exclusionary rule, the
form the process model takes is unclear. Some lower courts have read
Stone to be concerned only with the "opportunity" to litigate in state
court rather than with actual litigation that was "full and fair. ' 25 8 Thus
petitioners who fail to litigate exclusionary rule claims when given a
chance to do so are foreclosed from raising those claims later in
habeas. 259 Forfeiture under Stone occurs, accordingly, without regard to
the ordinary rules in habeas for appraising the federal effect of procedural default in state court. If this is what Stone means, then it is not so
2 60
closely related to versions of the process model in other contexts.
The second observation about Stone and the process model is that
the Court repeatedly has refused to extend the approach in Stone to other
issues. 26 1 Accordingly, even if Stone established a beachhead for the pro256 See text accompanying note 229 supra.
257 See text accompanying note 249 supra. It is not at all clear, for example, whether the
"full and fair hearing" idea from Townsend, a case about factfinding in habeas, can be of help
in determining whether the state courts accorded a litigant an "opportunity" for "full and fair
litigation" of a substantive, fourth amendment claim within the meaning of Stone. In Stone
itself, the Court used the introductory signal "cf." in referring to Townsend-suggesting that,
at best, that case was only analogous. See 428 U.S. at 494 n.36; see also Halpern, supra note
250, at 14 n.94, 15-16 (arguing that the premises of Townsend and Stone are actually at odds).
Lower courts have found it impossible to "borrow wholesale the Townsend formula for use in
the Stone situation." O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977). See also Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Reform of Federal Intervention in
State Proceedings Act of 1983, S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1983) (indicating
that "full and fair" adjudication in state court within the meaning of the Reagan adminstration's current proposal to amend the habeus statutes contemplates a "reasonable" judgment on
the merits).
258 E.g., Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1980) (invoking Stone to foreclose
federal habeas notwithstanding state court procedural error that thwarted presentation of the
petitioner's exclusionary rule claim); see L. Yackle, supra note 23, at § 99 (collecting
authorities).
259 See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1038 (1978).
260 See text accompanying notes 263-81 infra. There is another, competing view, which
reads Stone as only an "issue preclusion" case, limited to fourth amendment exclusionary rule
contentions. If, then, an exclusionary rule argument was presented to and decided by the state
courts, it is precluded in federal habeas. If, however, the issue was not raised and adjudicated
in state court, the ordinary rules for judging the federal effect of procedural default control.
Dunn v. Rose, 504 F. Supp. 1333, 1335-39 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has confused the matter further by recalling Stone to have
focused not upon an "opportunity" for "full and fair litigation," but upon a "full and fair
opportunity" for litigation. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75,
82 n.5 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n. 11 (1977). The shift in language may
have been simply mistaken, but it is curious that the same "mistake" should have been made
twice.
261 The Justices passed over an opportunity to extend Stone to sixth amendment claims in
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and explicitly distinguished Stone in a grand jury
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cess model in habeas, it appears that in nearly ten years the assault has
not advanced beyond the shallows occupied by the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. This is not to suggest that Stone was correctly decided
and now only wants for a better opinion in justification-one that does
not depend upon the process model. The point is only that Stone itself
constitutes slim evidence that the process model has any significant role
2 62
to play in habeas generally.
3. State Court ProceduralDefault
The third instance in which the process model has intruded into
habeas is less apparent given the absence from the Court's opinions of
263
language associated with that model. The Court held in Fay v. Noia
that postconviction habeas was not subject to the adequate state ground
doctrine, which allows the Court itself to review questions of federal law
decided in state court only when the decision below cannot rest on state
grounds alone. 264 Would-be habeas applicants whose procedural defaults

resulted in state court refusal to consider federal claims might nevertheless pursue those claims in federal habeas. At the same time, the Court
said that habeas review could be denied to prisoners who "deliberately
bypassed" state opportunities to litigate federal claims. 265 So long as the
Court adhered to the Noia "deliberate bypass" rule, there was little similarity between its treatment of procedural default and the process model.
Petitioners were not turned away from habeas unless they had personally
participated in a deliberate strategy to circumvent the state courts. More
recently, however, the Court has read the adequate state ground doctrine
back into habeas, holding in Wainwright v. Sykes 2 66 that prisoners who

would be denied direct review because of state procedural grounds of
decision may be boxed out of federal habeas as well-unless they demonstrate "cause" for their defaults and "prejudice" flowing from the federal
error that, because of default, went uncorrected in state court. 2 67 The
discrimination case, Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560-64 (1979). See also Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981) (entertaining fifth and sixth amendment claims in habeas); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (entertaining a due process claim); Arizona v. Washington, 434
U.S. 497 (1978) (considering a double jeopardy issue). Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
87 n.1 1 (1977) (reserving the question whether Miranda claims are controlled by Stone).
262 See note 250 supra.
263 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
264 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590 (1875); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
265 Noia, 372 U.S. at 438.
266 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
267 Id. at 84, 90-91. For a more detailed discussion of Sykes, see L. Yackle, supra note 23,
§§ 70-87. The extent to which Sykes has eclipsed Noia entirely is open. Compare Holcomb v.
Murphy, 701 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.) (insisting that the Supreme Court "knows how to
overrule a case if it wishes to do so"), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1211 (1983) with United States ex
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result is that habeas applicants are routinely refused access to the federal
forum for the litigation of federal issues that were not, but might have
been, litigated in prior proceedings in state court. 268 The similarity of
269
this state of affairs to familiar claim preclusion is plain enough.
Here again, there is reason for pause. Writing for the Court in
Sykes, Justice

270
Rehnquist explicitly reatfirmed Brown v. Allen.

Notwithstanding their treatment of issues that might have been raised
and determined in state court, the Justices remain committed to the relitigation of issues that were raised and determined there. In a reversal of
the usual order, the Court apparently embraces something like claim preclusion in habeas even as it refuses to tolerate issue preclusion. 271 Even
when a petitioner failed to litigate a federal contention in state court,
however, Sykes does not automatically impose a forfeiture. Unlike the
situation in Stone, in which fourth amendment exclusionary rule issues
arguably may be foreclosed in habeas if there was any failure to take
advantage of state court opportunities to litigate, 272 and unlike the situation in the ordinary preclusion cases, in which claims are cut off absolutely unless some flaw is identified in state court process, 273 federal
issues can be entertained in federal habeas despite the petitioner's default
in state court-if the applicant can demonstrate "cause" and "prejudice." It will be difficult to meet these standards. 2 74 Yet, the very possibility they represent (and the different language in which they are
couched) suggests that they may fit the process model only roughly. In
the end, it may be that the analysis in Sykes is related to the process
model primarily with respect to its result (the foreclosure of federal
rel. Spurlark v. Wolff, 699 F.2d 354, 361 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that "the rumors of Fay's
death are not greatly exaggerated"). Cf. Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2907-08 (1984) (applying the Sykes doctrine but citing Noia with apparent approval).
268 E.g., Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (indicating that procedural
default due to ignorance or negligence may preclude federal habeas review). But see Carrier v.
Hutto, 724 F.2d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that "cause" should be found if defense
counsel committed default out of ignorance or oversight), cert. granted sub nom. Sielaff v.
Carrier, 105 S. Ct. 3523 (1985). See generally L. Yackle, supra note 23, § 86 (collecting cases
on procedural default in the wake of Sykes).
269 The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether federal issues that might have been
raised in defense in state court will be precluded later in the federal forum. See Migra v.
Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85 n.7 (1984).
270 433 U.S. at 87.
271 In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Court decided that issue preclusion rules
govern when prior proceedings were in state court, however, the Justices laid the more significant question of claim preclusion to one side. Id. at 94 n.5. The claim preclusion problem was
resolved only later, in Migra, 465 U.S. 75 (invoking state claim preclusion rules).
272 See text accompanying notes 258-60 supra.
273 See text accompanying notes 216-18 supra.
274 The feat has been accomplished. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2908-12
(1984).
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claims not raised in prior proceedings) rather than the reasons for that
result.
The Court's renewed insistence upon respect for state procedural
rules, even when litigants stand to lose the opportunity to litigate federal
issues in any court, reflects an exaggerated deference to the state courts.
The Rehnquist opinion in Sykes, and more recent opinions by other Justices in cases in the Sykes line,275 embrace a version of federalism already
shown to have no basis. 276 If this undifferentiated deference to the state

courts is stripped away, the only remaining justification for enforcing
state forfeiture rules is concern that litigants have insufficient incentives
to comply reasonably with the exhaustion doctrine and might, instead,
"save" federal issues for initial treatment in habeas. 277 Yet the exhaustion doctrine itself credits the state courts with the capacity to treat federal issues with sensitivity. Moreover, as noted above, rational litigants
would hardly find it so unlikely that they could obtain relief on the merits
in state court that they would prefer to bypass those courts entirely and
to seek only federal review.278 The Court in Noia anticipated that most
petitioners would find it to their advantage to give the state courts an
opportunity to award relief. The "deliberate bypass" exception to the
availability of federal habeas was narrow and, most likely, fashioned only
to reassure those who feared that the Court's decision might encourage
manipulative prisoners. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, recognized that procedural defaults can validly cut off further state remedies
and, in some instances, direct review in the Supreme Court. 279 He apparently concluded, however, that the threat of losing those opportunities
for winning relief would discourage rational petitioners from failing to
280
comply with state procedural requirements.

If my alternative explanation for habeas were adopted, the federal
habeas courts might well disregard procedural default in state court altogether and entertain federal claims even when petitioners "deliberately
bypassed" state procedures. Positing that prior state court litigation is
required primarily to maintain local control of the substantive criminal
law, and given the incentives that litigants have to raise federal claims
anyway, there is no reason why litigants' ultimate opportunity to pursue
federal claims in the federal forum should be freighted with mechanisms
275 See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (O'Connor, J.).
276 See text accompanying note 178 supra.

277 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977).
278 See text accompanying notes 226-27 supra.
279 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
280 That Justice Brennan had deterrence in mind is abundantly clear from his language.
E.g., id. at 439 ("At all events we wish it clearly understood that the standard here put forth
depends on the considered choice of the petitioner.").
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for enforcing state procedural rules. Once again, the effort the habeas
courts now waste in deciding whether to consider claims that were, or
might have been, litigated in state court should better be spent on the
28s
merits of those claims.
CONCLUSION

I hardly believe that the forces competing for dominance in American society can be yoked by structural arrangements alone. Devices that
allocate authority and responsibility are blunt instruments of social order, which achieve only a provisional peace between and among power
centers. Yet rough lines can and should be drawn in an effort to safeguard, however imperfectly, underlying values of transcendent importance. The framework I have suggested here is in this practical vein.
Presented with a system in which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in most federal question cases, in which the lower
federal courts have no power to review state court judgments on appeal,
and in which, accordingly, state court determinations are typically entitled to preclusive effect in later federal proceedings, I have attempted to
explain the existence of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners-which
seems, at first blush, to jar with much of the jurisdictional landscape in
which the writ is situated. I have rejected the conventional view that
postconviction litigation in habeas is justified by petitioners' interest in
freedom from unlawful detention and have offered an alternative explanation, which assigns significance, first, to the acknowledged arguments
in favor of a right to litigate federal claims in federal court, second, to the
less familiar but especially compelling case for such a right on behalf of
state criminal defendants, and third, to the largely neglected libertarian
values served by postponing criminal defendants' access to the federal
forum until after the state courts have completed their work. Along the
281 If the enforcement of the exhaustion doctrine is time-consuming, so too will the administration of the Court's analysis of abortive state proceedings promise burdensome work for a
federal district court. First, the court must ascertain whether there was a state procedural rule
demanding particular action, whether the petitioner at bar failed to comply with that rule, and,
if so, whether the state courts imposed a forfeiture sanction for the default. If such a forfeiture
is identified, the court must next determine whether the resulting state procedural basis of
decision constitutes an adequate and independent state ground sufficient to cut off direct review in the Supreme Court. Finally, assuming that the state procedural ground is wellfounded, the court must decide whether the default constituted a "deliberate bypass" of state
procedures, or, in circumstances in which that test is inapplicable, whether there was "cause'
for the default and "prejudice" flowing from the uncorrected federal error. Of course, a
factfinding hearing is usually necessary to make some or all of these determinations. I have
sketched the essential framework and provided relevant authorities. See L. Yackle, supra note
23, §§ 83-86. Judge Posner has recognized that in many instances it may be less onerous to
reach and determine the merits than to grapple with threshold issues regarding the effects of
procedural default. See Carbajol v. Fairman, 700 F.2d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1983).
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way, I have taken account of critics' assault on the writ, the persistent
contention that habeas should be governed by a process model, other
instances in which the process model checks the availability of federal
adjudication, and the occasions on which the process model appears to
have trespassed into the habeas sphere.
The adoption of my explanation for habeas would, I think, bring a
measure of clarity and intellectual coherency to the law of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, it would give effect to two principles of governmental
order in which, I confess, I believe there is incalculable value for human
liberty: the maintenance of decentralized control of the substantive criminal law and a bold and unflagging guarantee that rights established by
the United States Constitution will be enforced in independent federal
tribunals.
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